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I. INTRODUCTION: LEGAL ISSUES AND THE CHANGING
NATURE OF GRAIN PRODUCTION
Access to improved genetic materials plays a fundamental role in
the productivity of American agriculture. Farmers have viewed access
to improved seeds in the same light as seed companies. If plant breeders produce better, high yielding seed, then farmers prosper, as do the
companies. A question on the minds of many farmers is what role will
biotechnology and genetic engineering play in the future of farming?
A common assumption in U.S. agriculture is that biotechnology will
expand both the crops produced and their potential uses. Biotechnology may well hold the key to answering the world's nutritional needs,
to finding new industrial uses for agricultural products, and to creating new drugs. It may also bring riches to the plant breeders and genetic engineers who create the new plants and to the companies
marketing them. But will it benefit farmers? Recently several agricultural companies have moved into production of identity-preserved
or value-added crops such as high-oil corn. Value-added or identitypreserved production often relies on using production contracts with
growers, who produce the end-use tailored varieties under contract for
the seed company or the end user. Many farmers and companies hail
contract production of identity-preserved crops as the future of agriculture, creating opportunities for new markets and price premiums
for farmers. But will it mean new profits for farmers who raise the
crops? Are there legal risks associated with agreeing to raise grain
under production contracts? The use of contracts in agriculture has
been most widely developed in poultry production, where over ninety
percent of poultry is presently raised under contract. The remaining
share is owned directly by large processors. In grain production, the
development is still relatively new.'
1. For a discussion of current national data on contracting in American agriculture,
see Patrick M. O'Brien, Changes in the U.S. Agricultural and Food Marketing
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Will all farmers have access to contracts to raise improved grains?
If so, at what cost? If identity preservation means using production
contracts, will this change how this nation farms? Will it change who
buys crops, how they are priced, and the method of payment? Will it
change whether farmers can save seed they raise, or sell some to their
neighbors? What effect will it have on the traditional farm supply and
marketing structure? To answer these questions it is important to examine two major developments in American grain production: First,
the trend toward use of contract production for grain; and second, the
connection between this development and the protection of intellectual property rights for seeds and plants.
The purpose of this Article is to survey the emerging legal issues
associated with these two developments. The Article begins by reviewing the forces contributing to the increased use of production contracts and the reasons companies involved in grain processing and
marketing are attracted to using contracts. The Article then considers
the effect entering a production contract may have on the decisionmaking ability of farmers and the potential economic impacts of contracting. This discussion identifies a list of basic rules for farmers to
consider when evaluating contracting opportunities. The next section
of the Article is a more detailed discussion of selected legal issues
which may be associated with use of grain production contracts. A
variety of issues are discussed including the nature of the relationship, the forms of pricing terms used, and questions about the timing
of payment. This discussion is followed by an inventory of the different clauses typically found in production contracts, illustrated with
provisions from contracts currently being used in the Midwest. The
Article then presents a preliminary analysis of selected issues identified by reviewing contract provisions, including several UCC contract
questions commonly considered by courts. The section includes a discussion of the potential to use state legislation to regulate contracting
practices. Finally, a comprehensive discussion of the issue of intellectual property protections applicable to the production of grains is
presented. The discussion focuses on the impact such protections
have on the ability of farmers to save their own crops as seed to plant
or sell to other farmers. The Article concludes by discussing how the
increased use of contracting for the production of grain crops has the
potential to create a range of important legal and policy issues which
may need to be addressed both at the level of individual producers and
from the viewpoint of society as a whole.

System: Implications for PublicPolicy, NATIONAL
IN

AHEAD, Jan. 1994 at 19.

PLANNING ASSOCIATION: LOOK-
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Trends in Grain Production

The primary reason for considering the legal issues associated with
contract production of grain is the rapid increase in the use of such
arrangements in American agriculture. Contracts have traditionally
been used for the production of seeds and for many vegetable and horticultural crops. However, the use of contracting is now spreading
rapidly into traditional grains as companies involved in processing or
marketing grain products vertically integrate into crop production.2
Use of contracts to control grain production is part of a larger trend
toward use of contracts throughout agriculture, a trend which has
been labeled as part of the industrialization of agriculture. The trend
toward contracting has recently received increased public attention in
relation to rapid changes in midwestern swine production. A recent
report estimates that over twenty percent of swine are produced under
contract, up from only two percent in 1980.3 The same report indi-

cates that seven percent of both food grain and feed grain production
is raised under production or marketing contracts, an increase from
less than two percent in 1970.4 Some observers estimate that by the

year 2000 as much as twenty percent of the nation's corn and soybean
crops could be value-added or identity-preserved crops, which would
mean a sharp increase in the use of contracting in grain production. 5
The development of new marketing opportunities related to production of specialty or value-added crops has begun to receive considerable attention in the agricultural press. The articles generally focus
on the opportunities for entering new markets or obtaining price premiums which may be associated with contract production.6 The articles are an indication both of the increased level of contracting activity
and the interest of farmers in learning more about the opportunities
created by contract production of grain. Several different economic
and agronomic forces have caused increases in contract production of
grains. When considering the increase in grain contracting, several
labels and concepts relating to the trend need to be understood.
2. See Dirck Steimel, Pioneer Makes Move up the Food Chain, DES MoINES REG.,
Mar. 8, 1993, at 10S.
3. O'Brien, supra note 1.
4. O'Brien, supra note 1.
5. See Greg D. Horstmeier, FarmingBy Invitation Only, Top PRODUCER, Feb. 1993,
at 36.
6. See, e.g., Susan Davis, A Profit Paradise? SOYBEAN DIG., Feb. 1993, at 22; Rex
Gogerty, Farmingfor Factories,THE FURRow, NovlDec. 1991, at 10; Dan Looker,
Encouraging New Grain Markets, DES MOINES REG., July 14, 1991, at J1; Jeff
Morgan, Soybeans Grownfor Specialty Markets, Iowans Grow 'Identity Preserved'
Soybeans, IowA FARm BUREAU SPOKEsMAN, Feb. 1993; Chester Peterson, Jr.,
Food-Grade Corn Farmer,SUCCESSFUL FARMING, Mar. 1993; Libby Powers, Oil
Fields on the Prairie,Top PRODUCER, Jan. 1993, at B2.
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1. Identity-preserved grains: This term means crops for which
the identity and thus unique characteristics of the grain are preserved
from the time of production through marketing to processing and consumption. Identity-preserved grains may be those raised with
uniquely altered genetics which give them higher values, such as better animal feeds, or it may mean crops raised under unique production
methods.7 A prime example is Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.'s,
"Better Life Grain" Program, where grains are raised under contracts
in which producers agree to use no pesticides. 8 The grains are used by
food companies, such as cereal makers, in preparing pesticide-free
consumer products.9 In this regard, organic food production is another form of identity preservation.
2. Specialty crop production: This term may relate to either production of non-traditional varieties or forms of grain such as waxy
corn, white corn, or food grade soybeans; or the term may refer to raising identity-preserved crops. In some cases, specialty crop production
can also refer to producing traditional grains but marketing the commodities for non-traditional or industrial uses. In either case, the attraction of specialty grain production is the ability to enter a new or
niche market which will offer a price above that available in the public
marketplace. Specialty grain production differs from identity preservation in that it may not be based on using unique plant genetics or
production methods to result in the unique trait, but rather may just
depend on the producer's ability to price or market the commodity for
an alternative use.
3. End-use tailored varieties: This term is another way of
describing the process of identity preservation, but with the focus on
the work of plant breeders or genetic engineers in specifically designing a grain crop to express a trait which can result in added value.1O
The development of high-oil corn which has a higher value as an
animal feed component is an example of an end-use tailored variety.
The development of end-use tailored varieties such as high-oil corn is
bringing a number of new companies into agricultural production. Du

7. The development of identity-preserved crops is receiving considerable attention
in the grain processing industry. See, e.g., Bill Freiberg, Speakers from the Wet
Milling Industry Tell of Their Big Future Demandfor I.P Crops, SEED & CROPS
INDUsTRY, Feb. 1993, at 20.
8. 1993 Specialty Use Soybean Contract. "Better Life -P204" used by Pioneer HiBred International, Inc. in Iowa [hereinafter Pioneer Better Life Soybean

Contract].
9. For a discussion of this program, see Thomas N. Urban,AgriculturalIndustrialization: It's Inevitable, CHoicEs, 4th Quarter, 1991, at 4.
10. For a thorough discussion of this development, see David Wheat and Wade Wilson, Tailoring Grainsfor a Perfect Fit, FEEDSTUFFS, May 13, 1991, at 1.
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Pont, which has the rights to several high-oil corn varieties, has recently expanded into contract production of corn in Iowa."'
4. Value-added production: This is a more general and comprehensive term describing the process of producing commodities, such as
specialty grains, which sell for a price premium. It can also refer to
marketing traditional commodities in a way which increases their
value or the producer's returns-for example, food grade soybeans or
processing corn for ethanol. 12 In recent years, there has been much
attention given in American agriculture to the search for new uses for
traditional grain crops. 13 As part of the 1990 farm bill, Congress established the Alternative Agricultural Research and Commercialization Center (AARCC) as a special program within the USDA.14 The
AARCC has already received over $10 million to fund research and
development of such products.
5. Composition-based grain marketing: This term refers to a process for marketing commodities based on the value of the various feed
components they contain, such as the starch and oil in corn. This type
of marketing contrasts with traditional market grades or standards
which do not separately value these traits. The issue of changing the
way grains are priced and marketed has received considerable attention over the years in grain producing states.1 5 For example, the state
of Iowa, through the Department of Agricultural and Land Stewardship, has developed a program to promote composition-based grain
11. See Karol Wrage, Du Pont Enters the Seed and Grain Industry, SEED & CROPS
INDusTRY, Dec. 1992, at 8; Veronica Fowler, Du Pont Lab Set for Iowa, DEs
MoINEs REG., June 4, 1993, at 8S; and Dale Johnson, Du Pont to Start Valueadded Grain Market in Iowa, IOWA FARM BuREAu SPoEsMAN, June 12, 1993, at
3.
12. See Rex Gogerty, Cashingin on PremiumMarkers,THE FuRRow, MariApr. 1993,
at 10.
13. See Don Muhm, FindingNew Uses for Iowa's Surplus Crops, DES MoNES REG.,

May 13, 1992, at 8S (Hearing in Cedar Rapids by the USDA's Alternative Agriculture Research and Commercialization Board); Don Muhm, Project to Focus on
Special Crops, DES MomnEs REG., May 17, 1992, at J1, (Project by Iowa cooperatives to market specialty grains raised by members).
14. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104
Stat. 3359 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 5902 (Supp. IV 1992)). The AARCC
program has published a booklet entitled "Making It Happen: Expanding the
Use of Industrial Product from Agricultural Materials," which presents information on the variety of new uses and products funded with AARCC grants, including biodegradable packaging made from Kansas wheat and a new building
material, "Environ," made with Minnesota soybean meal, which looks like stone
but cuts like wood.
15. In 1987, several grain states including Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico,
and Wyoming enacted legislation creating an Interstate Compact on Agricultural
Grain Marketing Commission, which is working to develop new markets for
grain, including the promotion of composition based pricing. See IowA CODE ANN.
§ 183 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); Dan Looker, EncouragingNew Grain Markets,
DES MomrEs REG., July 14, 1991, at J1.
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marketing. The Department held a conference on the subject on
March 31, 1993, in Des Moines and published a catalog about the effort, referred to as the "Iowa Gold Catalog Program." 16 The catalog
provides comparative information on the performance of different corn
varieties as to the component production-for example, the percent of
corn oil and starch. This information can be used by producers and
processors in selecting which hybrids to plant.17 The development of
alternative methods to value and price grain in the public marketplace may receive increased attention in the future if concerns about
the impact of contracting should develop. This is true because composition-based marketing, through publicly discovered pricing mechanisms, provides information and a market available to all producers.
As such, it can provide an alternative to using production contracts,
which internalize the specialized pricing mechanism, meaning the
true value of the added traits are not revealed but instead negotiated
between the parties. This practice can leave producers at a disadvantage when bargaining with the company which both developed the genetics and has control over the end-use market.
B. Legal Significance of the Changes in Grain Production
Regardless of how the process is described, changes in the methods
of producing and marketing grains are exciting and important developments for American agriculture. The trend is exciting because it
may result in new markets, higher prices, price premiums, and even
new ways of pricing and marketing grain for American farmers. Presently most of the public discussion of contracting focuses on the positive economic benefits associated with it. A recent survey by the
University of Illinois found the majority of producers who have experience with contract production were satisfied and would continue to
use it.18 But while the economic benefits and opportunities may be
real, potential concerns also can arise in connection with contracting.
Issues concerning the impact of contracting on producers and the effect on the structure of agriculture need to be considered. The devel16. For a discussion of the program, see Robin Henriksen, Iowa ProgramMatchesI-P
Crops Suppliers with Buyers, SEED & CROPS INDUSTRY, Oct. 1992, at 33.

17. For a discussion of some of the issues arising in connection with this development, see Mick Lane, Conflict Over Composition, SOYBEAN Di., Apr. 1991, at 18;
Mick Lane, A Bonus for Better Beans? SoYBFAN DIG., Apr. 1991, at 22.
18. See, Robin Hoffman, 'SuperFarmers'Grab Crop Contracts,Top PRODUCER, May/
June 1992, at 24, (discussing a survey done by a graduate student, Karen Coaldrake, at the University of Illinois' Food and Agribusiness Management Program). According to the Coaldrake survey, of the 250 farmers surveyed in eastcentral Illinois over 30% had at least one production contract. The survey also
found that while growers noted the difficulties in satisfying contract terms, such
as high quality standards, over 90% of those with contracts expressed an intention to continue contracting.
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opment is important to the legal community and society for several
reasons beside the possible economic impacts. Other important questions concerning the development of contract production include how
it will change methods of producing and marketing of grain, what new
legal issues may arise or be created, and how it reflects the industrialization of agriculture. This Article attempts to identify some of the
issues which may be associated with contracting and explore the possible legal implications. By considering the actual language used in
grain production contracts and the legal implications of contract production, individual producers and society can come to a more informed
understanding of the possible impact and value of contracting.
C.

Relation of Contract Production to Industrialization

As noted in the introduction, the use of contracting for grains can
be seen as part of the ongoing process of the industrialization of agriculture. Perhaps the best description of the industrialization of agriculture and how it relates to contract production was set forth by
Thomas Urban.19 Urban describes industrialization as the process
whereby the production of goods is restructured under the pressure of
increasing levels of capital and technology in a manner which allows
for a management system to integrate "each step in the economic process to achieve increasing efficiencies in the use of capital, labor, and
technology."20 He has this to say about the change: "Production agriculture in the Western World is now entering the last phase of industrialization-the integration of each step in the food production
system. The production is rapidly becoming part of an industrialized
food system."21 While not advocating the changes, Urban views the
development optimistically, noting it will maximize uniformity and
predictability in agricultural production allowing for branding of food
and marketing of identity-preserved products, a development his
plant breeders are actively pursuing. He believes it will attract capital to agriculture and lead to more rapid adoption of new technologies.
He is also optimistic it will create opportunities for agriculture, possibly giving rise to a new family farm that is "dependent as much on
financial management skills and contract marketing as on production
and agronomy know-how"-a "super farmer" who will respond quickly
to new opportunities to increase income and reduce risk.22
The development of specialty crops and industrial uses creates the
potential for greatly expanded marketing opportunities and greater
diversity in the mix of crops raised. But legal issues, such as producer
19. Thomas Urban, Agricultural Industrialization: It's Inevitable, CHOICEs, 4th
Quarter, 1991, at 4.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id.
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access to contracting opportunities and the role of specialty crop production in spurring concentration of production, are real. 2 3 The trend
toward increased contract production raises fundamental legal issues
which will challenge both the farming community and agricultural
lawyers. The increased use of contract production may raise questions
both about the fairness of the contracts being offered producers and
the economic effect of vertical integration in agriculture. Critics
charge that contracting reduces farmers to low wage employees who
assume most of the financial risks without the potential for increased
returns. 2 4 As is discussed in a later section, some states, such as Minnesota, have responded to the trend toward agricultural contracting
by enacting legislation to regulate use of production contracts and protect producers who enter such agreements. 25 If the new opportunities
for specialty grain production and marketing are accomplished primarily through use of production contracts, as it appears is the trend,
then lawyers will need to recognize the impact the use of contracts
may have on producers, the companies using the contracts, and on the
larger agricultural system and society.
D.

Reasons Agricultural Companies Use Production
Contracts

There are a number of reasons why companies involved in development or production of identity-preserved grains or specialty crops may
insist the production be done using grower contracts.
1. Contracts provide control over the production methods and inputs used, thereby helping to insure uniformity and quality of the
commodity produced and making it more suitable for preparing standardized consumer products.
2. Contracts offer a mechanism to control the quantity of crops
produced and the manner in which they are marketed to processors
and consumers, helping increase the price premiums obtained and
prevent over supplies which may decrease demand.
3. Contracts allow the company to lock-in a guaranteed supply to
meet potential needs, but to do so using pricing arrangements which
limit the risk of having to acquire more crop than is needed or actually
23. See Hoffman, supra note 18 (discussing some problems farmers encountered,
such as the Frito-Lay decision to not contract with North Dakota potato growers
who have less than 1,000 acres). See also Laura Sands, Time Bombs In Your
Contracts, Top PRODUCER, Mid-Feb. 1994, at 13.
24. See, e.g., Dan Looker, Hog Feeding on Contract: Safe Money or Servitude, DES
MomnEs REG., Aug. 15, 1989, at 1A; Cynthia Hubert, ContractPoultry Farming
Decried by Activists at Meeting, DES Momss REG., Feb. 2, 1992, at 3A.
25. MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.90-17.98 (West Supp. 1994). See infra text accompanying
notes 98-109. For a discussion of the Minnesota law, see Neil Hamilton and Greg
Andrews, State Regulation of Contract Feeding and Packer Integration in the
Swine Industry, DRAXE UNIV. LAw SCHOOL, WHITE PAPER 92-4, Nov. 1992.
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marketed to users. For example, "passed acres" clauses, which are
common in vegetable contracts, allow the company to not harvest or
purchase the crop, even if it meets contract standards. Instead, the
price from a pool of funds
producer is paid a portion of the contract
26
established by a charge on all contracts.
4. Contracts may promote (or require) adoption or application of
related technologies or production methods, some of which may also be
marketed by the company, providing opportunities for economic
linkages.
5. Contracts give the company control over the release of specialized crop genetics which may create the added-value trait, allowing
the contract to serve as an additional form of intellectual property
right protection to control the unauthorized reproduction of the crop.
6. Contracts offer a way to preserve the confidentiality of the pricing and marketing arrangements for the special commodity and the
identity of the end-user or purchaser, which prevents producers from
contacting the purchaser directly.
7. Contracts using non-public pricing and marketing of the commodities also allow for concealment of the true magnitude of any price
premium obtained for the special trait, allowing the company to obtain
higher corporate returns and limit the knowledge or ability of producers to bargain for a larger share of the added value.
8. Contracts give companies making investments in value-added
crop breeding and genetic engineering a mechanism to project the
company's financial interests, and thus potential returns, farther
down the production process of the crop, without having to own the
land or production facilities. This allows the company to increase the
returns to the investors who funded the research which "created" the
added value. It also allows the company to become involved more directly in crop production without worrying about investments in farmland, which are prohibited under the anti-corporate farming laws of
several midwestern states. 27 The use of contracts may illustrate the
attitude, "Why own the farm if you can own the farmer?"
When taken together these factors explain why many companies
traditionally involved in agricultural sales, such as seed companies,
chemical manufacturers, and grain merchandisers, are now contracting with farmers for production of commodities. The potential financial returns and market linkages also help explain why large
corporations not traditionally involved in crop production, such as Du
26. For a case involving a "passed acres" clause, see Myron Soik & Sons v. Stokely
USA, 498 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), discussed supra in section IIIA2.
27. See infra text accompanying note 61. See, e.g., IOWA CODE A-N. § 9H (West Supp.
1993); NEB. CONST. ART. XII, § 8 (the constitutionality of which was recently
again upheld in MSM Farms, Inc. v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1991)).
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Pont, have recently decided to enter the area.28 The development of
contract production is another factor in the process of moving the economic activity of agriculture away from farmers and to the input or
marketing sectors.
Stew Smith documented the decline of the economic contribution of
farmers. 2 9 He observed that agriculture consists of three sectors:
farming, the input sector, and the marketing sector. Each sector
makes a contribution to the economic output of the collective food and
agriculture economy. Between 1910 and 1990, however, the share of
agriculture contributed by the farm sector dropped from twenty-one
percent to five percent, with most of this shift being assumed by the
input sector. Smith noted that the historic explanation for why farm
numbers were declining-farmers were getting more efficient and society did not need them anymore-was in reality only half the truth.
He wrote: "The whole truth would have also stated that much activity
performed by existing farmers was being absorbed by nonfarmers, primarily in the input supplying firms."30 Smith's perspective is that
much of the shift is the result of how technology has been developed
and employed in agriculture.
Smith also responded to the argument that the land grant university (LGU) research community has been biased toward larger farms,
rather than being scale-neutral, by concluding both positions are
wrong. He concluded that most LGU research has been sector biased.
Most agricultural research leads to more nonfarm activity at the expense of
farming activity. This shift from farm to nonfarm reduces returns to farmers
to cover opportunity costs and requires farmers either to increase production
or utilize their excess management and labor in nonfarm pursuits. Indirectly
the technology results in fewer and larger farms (in terms of commodity pro31
duction) and more part-time farms, but the direct cause is the sector bias.

Smith illustrated this analysis by contrasting the forces which have
driven the development of a "high technology" input, such as the hormone bST, which can increase dairy production, with the lack of research on a management based technology, such as intensive
rotational grazing, which may not result in a marketable input but
can be as effective at increasing dairy productivity and farm profits.
It is no mystery why that alternative research was not conducted. There was
no private sector to contribute funds to public research or to conduct its own
research. But if there is a societal objective to maintaining farming, farms,
we should have devoted public research to that aland farming communities,
32
ternative research.
28. See supra note 11.
29. Stew Smith, Farming-It'sDeclining in the U.S., CHOICEs, 1st Quarter 1992, at
8; George Anthan, The Decline of Farming,DES Moss REG., May 10, 1992, at
J1.
30. Smith, supra note 29, at 8.
31. Smith, supra note 29, at 9.
32. Smith, supra note 29, at 10.
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The implications from Smith's analysis are apparent and timely, as
is their application to the development of contract production of enduse tailored grains. The present agricultural system, from the research community to the input and marketing sectors, are all contributing directly to the loss of farm numbers. While Smith notes it may
seem ludicrous to suggest farming could cease to exist in our agricultural system, he concludes:
Without substantial alteration of an array of agriculture policies, particularly technology development, the 80 year trend line of reduced farming activities will continue.
Biotechnology being developed today with the support of the LGUs will
lead to a more industrialized system, with most farming activity conducted by
part-time farmers and nonfarm firms performing much of the production activity away from the soil. Full time, 3family-owned
and managed farming, as
3
we have known it will cease to exist.

One social issue associated with contract production of grain is
whether the increases in economic activity accompanying the development will add to the incomes of farmers or whether the development
will be one more factor contributing to the movement of the marketing
and input sectors into agricultural production.
E.

Impact of Contracts on Farmers: Risk Sharing or Risk
Shifting?

Any farmer considering signing a production contract to raise a
crop must reflect on the advantages and disadvantages offered by the
contract. This will require not only an appraisal of the legal terms
and financial incentives in the contract but also a consideration of
what entering a contract means as to the farmer's control and decisionmaking authority. In traditional grain production without contracts, farmers have a full range of freedom and risk as to their
decisions including what crops to raise, when and where to plant, how
to produce the crop, where to purchase the inputs, when to harvest,
when to market, and how to price the crop. The farmer is exposed to
all the risks of the production, including market fluctuation-both up
and down, poor weather, increased input costs, and other factors reducing production or returns.
In contrast, under a typical production contract, to obtain the
promised price improvement the farmer may give up a considerable
amount of control or flexibility in the conduct of the farm operation,
including decisions regarding what crop to raise, when and where to
plant, what production methods to employ, when to harvest, and to
whom and when the crop is marketed. In exchange for this loss of
freedom, the farmer generally obtains an advance assurance of a guaranteed market, perhaps at a fixed price, and usually some type of
33. Smith, supra note 29, at 8.
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price premium for raising the crop. The contract may reduce the risk
of low financial returns; however, as the following review of contract
terms reveals, under the language of most contracts, the majority of
risk factors remain with the farmer. For example, the risk of a crop
loss or increased input costs remains with the producer. In some cases
even the promised price premium may be diminished because of adverse market movements or crop demand. Entering a production contract may even create new forms of risk not normally associated with
crop production, including the risk of not being paid by the company,
which may not be subject to state grain dealer laws, and the risk of
having the commodity produced determined to be unacceptable under
the contract for failing to meet quality or other specifications. Another
significant risk of farming under contract is the risk of losing access to
34
the special market in future years if the contract is not renewed.
A related risk if contracts are terminated concerns the investments
in buildings or equipment which might have been made in order to
obtain the contract. A recent Iowa case, brought by a group of tomato
growers against Heinz, is an example of a dispute over damages
caused by the alleged breach of a crop production contract. 35 In this
case, growers sought damages for recovery of such costs as the acquisition of expensive tomato harvesters after Heinz terminated their
growing arrangements. The most significant issue in the case, and
one which will undoubtedly be the subject of many future agricultural
contacting disputes, was whether the court would find that the conduct or oral promises by the company operated to extend the contractual obligation beyond the one year period specified in the written
agreement. Although, the suit was settled in January 1993, the terms
of the settlement were confidential.
A final, and perhaps the most significant, risk of entering a contract is that if it fixes a sale price, the producer has lost the opportunity to take advantage of higher prices which might result from
reduced supplies or other favorable market forces. This means one
risk the farmer may not have under contract production is the opportunity to make a large profit from favorable price swings. The inventory of concerns, while negative in tone, does not mean all contract
production relationships are unwise or risky. The true impact of contracting will be a function of the terms of the contract, the attitude of
the company toward the growers, and the economic forces which influence production and prices. Contracts can be written which are balanced and equitable. For example, InterMountain Canola contracted
34. For a discussion of experiences of farmers who have had problems with contract
production relations, see Laura Sands, Contracts Made to be Broken, Top PRODUCER, Oct. 1992, at 24.
35. See Beachy v. Heinz, CL. No. C6389-492, in the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County.
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for production of over 75,000 acres of canola in western states in 1993,
an increase in production from only 30,000 acres the preceding year.
The reason for the increase was the company's use of an innovative
contract which offered growers, among other things, a guaranteed peracre payment, a guaranteed market for the harvested crop regardless
36
of quality, a guaranteed contract price, and oil and yield bonuses.
Contracts which share the risks, rather than simply shifting the risks
to the producer, are possible. But the development of such contracts
may only be possible if producers and their attorneys work to insure
such terms. It is unreasonable to rely on the good will of the company
writing the contract and expect it to offer terms which protect the
farmer's financial interests.
F. Possible Impacts of Grain Production Contracting for
Farmers
When considering a possible contract production arrangement, it is
up to the producer to consider why the increased economic returns are
being offered. If grain production contracts result in increased economic returns for farmers, it is important to recognize the increased
compensation will be in exchange for some action. Depending on the
crop involved and the terms of the contract, the required action-in
contractual terms, the consideration-from the producer, could be in
the form of (1) increased production costs associated with complying
with contract requirements; (2) reduced flexibility in how to farm and
loss of control over pricing and marketing; (3) compensation for lower
yields of the crop, known as the "production penalty," which can result
if the specialized grains are less productive than traditional varieties;
(4) compensation for the reduction in marketing due to the application of quality controls; for example, if the entire crop will not be marketable at the price premium; or (5) higher priced inputs for
production; for example, if special seeds are required under the
contract.
If contract production is being considered, farmers must recognize
the changes which may be associated with producing crops under contract. The following discussion identifies several possible impacts on
farmers, using examples of provisions taken from production contracts
currently in use.
1. Evaluation of Production Under the ContractPerformance
Terms
To obtain promised price premiums, farmers will have to satisfy
the contract by complying with its requirements. Contract production
36. See Ed Narigon, InterMountain CanolaDoubles ContractedAcreage with a Contract Growers Can't Refuse, SEED & CROPS INDUSTRY, June/July 1993, at 30.
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may limit the flexibility to farm as desired. It introduces the risk that
the crop produced will not be accepted under the contract. The following production clause illustrates this risk.
Production: The Grower shall furnish food bean crop that meets the followinga. Passed Field Inspection
b. No. 1 Yellow Soybeans-14 PCT Moisture Maximum
c. Free of dirty, green and or moldy seed
d. Free of soil particles on the seed
e. Free from varietal mixtures
f. 40 PCT screenings Maximum
g. Free from corn, nightshade, buffalo bur and cocklebur
h. Free from green weed seed and pods that may cause bin spoilage
Any soybeans not meeting these standards shall be disqualified from all
premiums and at Fairview Farms Inc. option, be released
37 from this contract or
purchased on the local grain elevator price schedule.

2. Access to Contracts, or Who Will Have the Opportunity to
Participate?
The answer to the above question, which was noted earlier, depends on the crop and the company involved in producing it. The factors which may determine if a producer has the opportunity to
contract could include (1) whether a certain minimum size operation
is required, (2) whether there are necessary investments in equipment, (3) the existence of a business relation with the contracting company, and (4) whether there are other added costs associated with the
contract. 38 The requirement of additional capital investments may
not be as significant with grain production as with contracting for
other crops. Swine contracts, for example, typically require producers
to construct new buildings to the contractor's specifications. But there
can be new requirements as to machinery or production methods for
grain production. As companies involved in marketing pesticides develop grain genetically engineered to be tolerant to their products, it is
likely their production contracts will require use of these inputs. It
may become common to see companies marketing packages of production technologies, including herbicides, seeds, and markets, all in the
form of one integrated production agreement.
3. Contractingmay Change the Marketing and Payment System
The contract may call for the direct delivery of the crop to the enduser or the contracting company, thereby bypassing local marketing
outlets where the grain was typically sold. Similarly, depending on
the crop involved and the contract, the pricing mechanism may bypass
37. 1992 Seed Production Contract Used by Fairview Farms, Inc., Corwith, Iowa (emphasis added) [hereinafter Fairview Farms Soybean Contract].
38. See Greg D. Horstmeier, FarmingBy InvitationOnly, Top PRODUCER, Feb. 1993,

at 36.
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the traditional price discovery process. The price may be based solely
on the contract term rather than the traditional methods of price discovery in marketing commodities, such as local cash prices or futures
prices. This is common for production of crops such as vegetables for
which there is not a public marketing system. A pea bean contract3 9
used by Joseph Campbell Co. set the price term of the contract as
follows:
PRICE: The price, delivered, per net cwt. of pea beans shall be:
(a) the quantity of cwt. of "Sound Beans" in the load (as such term is defined
in "United States Standards for Beans" effective June 4, 1982), reduced, in
case of loads which grade more than 18.0% moisture, by the applicable "Percent Shrink" for the load as shown on the attached "Schedule A";
multiplied by,
(b) $19.00 per cwt., less the following deductions (if any) for the following
conditions:
(1) Deduction for Cost of Drying;
(2) Deduction for Picking Charge to Remove Damaged Beans;
(3) Deduction for Removal of Corn, Soybeans and Contrasting Classes of
Beans.
(c) Buyer will deduct,4 0and pay to the Michigan Bean Commission, Grower's $0
per cwt. assessment.

Many grain production contracts provide a combined pricing mechanism which uses the traditional pricing system to establish a base
price to which a price premium is added. Such contracts commonly
give the producer flexibility to choose the date on which the base price
is set. The contract will also identify any price premium the producer
is to receive and any bonuses which can be earned depending on the
quality of crop delivered. For example, the Pioneer Better Life Soybean Contract, provides:
II. The Company will pay the grower the base selling price for all bushels
delivered basis US #1 Soybean with market scale of discounts to apply at time
of delivery. Grower Acknowledges that the Base Selling Price will be equal to
the current price quote for the delivery month of choice as quoted by the Company for the location stated above. Call the Pioneer SPP Grain Desk at 1-800356-0393 for pricing information.
III. A premium of $1.00
per bushel will be paid for the net bushels of clean
41
food grade soybeans.

4. Application of Price Discounts for Poor Quality
One important pricing question which can arise under contract
sales is the issue of the applicable level of price and quality discounts.
It is common for a contract to provide that the final price is subject to
"discounts to apply at the time of delivery" as in the Pioneer Better
39. 1991 Pea Bean Contract used by Joseph Campbell Co. in Ohio, [hereinafter
Campbell Pea Bean Contract].
40. Id.
41. Pioneer Better Life Soybean Contract, supra note 8.
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Life Soybean Contract. 42 Producers may not realize the level of discounts applied within the grain trade can change significantly during
a marketing period. For example, the discounts applied in the Midwest for low test weight corn were much smaller in the spring of 1993
than the discounts which were applied at the time of harvest in the
fall. The poor growing conditions during 1993 resulted in a great deal
of low test weight corn, with poorer feed value and less storage life.43
The low test weight grain is also subject to discounts under the
USDA's grain storage programs. 44 All of these factors meant grain
elevators were less willing to purchase poor quality grain without applying significant dockage. Some elevators limited the amount of poor
quality grain they took in storage by refusing to accept corn below a
certain quality level.
5.

Timing and Method of Payment may be Altered

Instead of being paid on delivery as may be required under state
law for normal grain sales, the contract may not require payment on
delivery or sale but instead provide for installment payments or bonuses paid at later times. The Pioneer Better Life Soybean Contract
provides:
7. GROWER PAYMENT: Payment (check issued and mailed) for soybeans
sold prior to delivery will occur within 10 days after last delivery and acceptance date. Payment for soybeans sold after delivery and acceptance will occur
within 10 days after selling date. The payment amount for each payment date
shall include the appropriate premiums for the bushels sold. The Company
shall have the right to deduct from the first payment any amount the Grower
owes the Company for any reason whatsoever.
8. DEFERRED PRICING If Grower elects to defer pricing beyond the date
the grower delivers5 his grain, he must sign a Price Later Agreement (Credit
4
Sale Agreement).

How the contract alters the timing for payment can also have implications under the grain dealer laws of a state. These laws may place
time limits on when payment is to be made for grain. For example,
dealers typically have to pay upon delivery and may be required to
obtain bonds which are used to pay growers if the buyer should default.46 However, if the contract alters the timing of payment, the
producer may have transferred the title to the grain to the dealer but
have only a contract claim for payment. The farmer's ability to receive
compensation under a state grain dealer bonding law will depend on
42. Supra note 8.
43. Charles Hurburgh, Jr., Low Test Weights Surfacing in '93 Corn, IOWA FARM BuRF u SPOxEsiAN, Nov. 6, 1993, at 1.
44. Dale Johnson and Rick Robinson, 1993 Corn Harvest BringingLow Test Weights;
Sharp Discountsfor Iowa Farmers,IowA FAmi BUREAU SPoKEsMAN, Nov. 6, 1993,
at 1.
45. Pioneer Better Life Soybean Contract, supra note 8.
46. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 203.8 (West. Supp. 1993).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:48

whether the contract purchaser was considered a grain dealer. While
issues of payment may not be significant when dealing with wellknown publicly traded companies such as Pioneer or Du Pont, producers who are selling specialty crops to small or newly created grain
marketing firms should take precautions to insure they will be paid
for the grain once it has been delivered or the title has passed.
6. Potentialfor Non-ProductionReasons to be Basis for
Termination
If a farmer violates any clause of a contract, it may be a basis for
the other party to treat the contract as having been breached. This is
true even though the real reason the other party wants out of the contract is due to an adverse price movement or other market concerns.
Quality provisions in contracts which leave the determination of compliance solely in the hands of the company, without any outside independent inspection process, create an opportunity for market
factors to serve as the basis for rejecting the crop and finding the contract has not been performed.
G. Basic Legal Rules of Contracting
Each grain production contracting experience will be unique depending on the nature of the relation between the parties, the terms of
the offered contract, and the bargaining position of the parties. However, there are a number of common legal rules about grain contracting which lawyers and farmers should understand.
1. Read and understand any contract before signing. Contract
terms play a fundamental role in determining the rights and duties of
the parties. A good example is understanding the difference between
a bushel contract, which commits a producer to delivering a fixed
amount regardless of the crop actually raised, and an acreage contract, which promises delivery of whatever amount is raised on a designated number of acres. If the terms of a contract are not clear, a
producer should consider having an attorney review it. Legal advice is
an investment, not a cost, when it avoids confusion and prevents unfavorable economic decisions.
2. Compliance with contract terms is required; price premiums
will not be paid unless the terms are satisfied. Failure to comply with
the contract may subject the grower not just to lower returns, but to
damages, penalties for breach, and other remedies. It is important to
understand the contract provisions relating to default. Producers
who, because of bad weather, are unable to satisfy a contract committing them to deliver a fixed number of bushels, might be surprised to
learn they have to enter the market and buy higher priced grain to
satisfy their obligation.
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3. Know the contracting party and its financial and performance
history. This knowledge is essential in helping insure the producer
will be paid for any crops delivered. This knowledge is especially important if the contract calls for the passage of legal title when the commodity is delivered or for a delay in the payment. What happens if the
buyer goes out of business or does not pay are questions that should
always be considered before signing.
4. Weigh the advantages of the contract in terms of higher prices
against any increased costs or risks. While a proposed production incentive such as a two dollar per bushel premium may appear attractive, it is important to calculate the real costs and risks presented by
complying with the contract. Remember, the additional revenue is in
exchange for something. Perhaps the unique variety of grain being
raised has a significant yield penalty or preserving its identity will
impose significant storage costs.
5. Contracts are always subject to negotiation. Just because a
term is in writing does not mean it cannot be changed if both parties
agree to do so. Of course this will depend on whether the producer has
the power to negotiate with the company or whether there are other
growers willing to sign the contract. If any changes are made in the
contract, make sure they are in writing and separately signed by the
company representative.
6. Remember the first rule of contracts-the parties who write
the contracts take care of themselves. There is no reason to assume
the contract being offered is either fair or protective of the producer's
interests. Even though a grower may trust the company, grain production contracts are arms-length business transactions. This rule is
especially important because in most contracting situations farmers
are offered written contracts and have no real ability to negotiate or
alter the terms.
7. Do not rely on oral communications made by the company
either before the contract is signed or during performance. If what is
being communicated is important to the relation be sure it is reduced
to writing, signed by both parties, and incorporated as an amendment
47
to the contract.
II.

LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE USE OF GRAIN
PRODUCTION CONTRACTS

The preceding section has discussed how signing a contract for the
production and marketing of grain has the potential to result in fun47. For a case involving a dispute between a grower and a company concerning alleged oral modification in the payment and delivery terms of a sunflower contract, see Neibert v. Schwenn Agri-production Corp., 579 N.E.2d 389 (M1.App. Ct.
1991), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 112-116.
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damental shifts in the nature of farming. The contract, because of its
binding and enforceable legal nature, will also place new obligations
and responsibilities on the parties, especially the farmer. To have a
better understanding of the legal impacts of grain production it is
worthwhile to consider some of the legal questions grain production
contracts might create. It is possible to illustrate both the range of
issues and their legal significance by considering the typical clauses
used in current contracts.
A.

Nature of the Relation: What Legal Relation is Being
Created?
One of the first questions which can arise under grain production
contracts concerns the nature of the relationship created between the
farmer and the company. The question can be very important in
resolving subsequent disputes because it will determine how the
courts will treat the parties in a variety of legal contexts, including
such matters as potential liability for any damages caused or disputes
over who has title to the crop. The answer to the question will be
found either in the specific language of the transaction or by considering the actual nature of the relationship the parties created. The following types of relations are possible options under grain production
contracts.
1. Simple Contract for Sale
In a traditional forward contract, a producer agrees to sell an
amount of a commodity at some date in the future. The relation created is simply one of a contract for the sale of goods. A forward contract generally does not call for any sharing of control over how the
commodity is produced or contain any additional form of price enhancement based on performance of other contract terms. Instead it
is merely an agreement to sell a certain amount of a commodity at a
set price and at a future time. 48 Article 2 of the UCC applies to such
contracts because they are for the sale of goods.
2. Independent Contractor
Grain production contracts which call for the producer to perform
special functions, such as to produce an identity-preserved crop or to
employ specific production methods, typically characterize the relationship of the farmer to the company as being that of an independent
contractor. Consider the following language from a 1989 Stokely
USA, Inc. sweet corn contract:
48. For a general discussion of the application of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) to these contracts, see Richard A. Malm, Contractsfor Future Delivery of
Grain: An Overview of Common Legal Problems, 2 AGRic. L.J. 483 (1980-81).
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AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR: The Contractor hereby undertakes the
production hereunder as an Independent Contractor and not as an employee
of the Company. He shall have exclusive possession of the property upon
which the crop is to be grown and shall not be subject to discharge by the
Company, who holds no control over him in the performance of his contract
other than as to the results to be accomplished. He may use such facilities
and employ such labor as he desires to carry out this contract, and all persons
employed by
him for that purpose shall be his employees and not those of the
49
Company.

A somewhat different version of such a clause is found in a Du Pont
corn contract. It provides:
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
GROWER is for the purposes of this agreement an independent contractor
and nothing contained in this agreement shall make GROWER an employee
or agent of DU PONT or authorize him to act on DU PONT's behalf.
GROWER shall indemnify and hold DU PONT harmless from any and all
claims, in any way connected directly or indirectly with GROWER's operations pursuant to this agreement including GROWER's use of herbicides and
insecticides. GROWER shall carry adequate public liability and property
damage insurance. 50

A third example of contract language designed to characterize the producer's status as an independent contractor is found in the Pioneer
Better Life Soybean Contract.
This Contract represents the full and entire agreement between the parties.
The parties agree that no change, modification, or alteration of terms and conditions of this Contract shall apply unless the same is in writing and signed by
the Grower and the Company. The arrangement shall be one of independent
contractors and not one of partnership, employment, joint venture or principal
and agent. The Grower agrees to comply with all applicable local, state and
federal laws, rules, and regulations. 5 1

The reasons companies employ such language characterizing the
relation of the farmer to the company as that of an independent contractor are apparent from the wide range of circumstances and potential liability they are attempting to avoid. An issue which would be
worthy of further exploration, if a dispute arose concerning whether a
producer was in fact an independent contractor, would be how the relation created under the contract would be evaluated under other legal
tests for independent contractors. For example, the Internal Revenue
Service has published its own list of twenty factors for determining
whether or not an independent contractor or an employee relationship
is established.52

49. 1989 Sweet Corn Contract used by Stokely USA, Inc. [hereinafter Stokely Sweet
Corn Contract].
50. Da Pont High Oil Corn Contract.
51. Pioneer Better Life Soybean Contract, supra note 8.
52. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
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3. PersonalService Contract
A third option for classifying the relation created under a grain
production contract is to treat it as a contract for personal services,
rather than as a sale of goods. A contract for the production of gourmet popcorn, 53 provided under "additional terms and conditions" the
following:
Personal Services/Assignment: Grower and Company agree that this Agreement is, and shall be considered in the nature of a contract for personal services to be performed solely by the Grower and that a major consideration for
its execution between the parties has been the Company's reliance upon
Grower's expertise and ability to perform according to its terms. As such, this
Agreement may not be assigned by Grower for any reason, either in whole or
in part, whether by voluntary act or operation of law, except with Company's
prior written consent. Failure of Grower to obtain said consent may, at the
sole election5 4of Company, be considered a material breach by Grower of this
Agreement.

Some courts have treated agricultural production contracts relating to
raising poultry as agreements for the provisions of services rather
than the sale of goods, which has a direct impact on the applicability
of various UCC doctrines. 55
4. Bailment

Another form of legal relation often specified in grain production
contracts, especially those involving seed production, is bailment. In
this regard, the characterization is not necessarily aimed at the
party's working relation, but instead concerns the producer's relation
to the seeds or plants being raised. As is discussed in Part IV, the
company is opposed to the grower being determined to have any ownership rights in the seed used or produced under the contract. As a
result, contracts for the production of seeds called "seedsmen contracts" have historically characterized the relation as a bailment. 5 6
There have been a number of cases analyzing the bailment theory as it
relates to legal claims such as breach of warranty or financial claims
such as mortgage foreclosures. 5 7
It is not uncommon to find current crop production contracts, even
those which label the relationship as that of an independent contractor, also containing language of bailment as to the producer's rights to
53. Gourmet Popcorn Contract used by Beatrice/Hunt-Wesson in Indiana [hereinafter Beatrice Popcorn Contract].
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Smith v. Central Soya of Athens, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 518, 523 (E.D.N.C.
1985).
56. For a discussion of these issues, see Annotation, CharacterOf Contractto Raise
Seed, 29 A.L.R. 647 (1924).
57. See, e.g., Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 814 P.2d 941 (Idaho Ct. App.
1990); First State Bank v. Simons, 13 P.2d 259 (Colo. 1932).
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the seed. For example, the Du Pont High Oil Corn Contract includes
the following paragraph:
BAILMENT
This is a Bailment contract. The parties agree that the seed, growing
crops, pollen, tissues or molecular components, and the harvested crop (hereinafter collectively referred to as TOPCROSS) are solely owned by DU PONT.
a. GROWER hereby agrees to not give, transfer, or sell TOPCROSS material
to any third party without written authorization by DU PONT.
b. GROWER agrees to use reasonable efforts to prevent access by third parties to TOPCROSS material.
c. GROWER shall return to DU PONT any seed not planted.
d. GROWER agrees not to grant or cause to be placed any lien or claim
against TOPCROSS material.5 s

5. Joint Venture, Partnership,and Employment.
It is apparent from the preceding examples that companies do not
desire grain production contracts to be classified in ways which would
increase their potential financial exposure or risks. If grain production contracts were treated as contracts for employment, joint ventures, or partnerships, then potential legal liability could arise from a
number of contexts including (1) environmental liability, such as related to pesticide use; (2) worker compensation, unemployment benefits, or other employee protections, both as to the grower and persons
employed in connection with the crop, such as under the Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act;59 (3) other forms of tort
liability, such as for accidents caused by the grower in the performance of the contract; (4) liability for loss of the crop due to warranty
issues, claims of defective inputs such as inferior seeds,60 or reliance
on adverse production advice; and (5) control of the property or engagement in farming, which might be contrary to the anti-corporate
farming laws present in nine midwestern states.61 If a contract is determined to give a company control over the production of the crop, or
58. Du Pont High Oil Corn Contract.
59. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1872 (West Supp. 1994).
60. For an excellent discussion of the legal issues in defective seed warranty cases,
see J.W. Looney, Obstacles to Recovery in Defective Seed Cases,AGRiC. L. UPDATE,
March 1993, at 4, and J.W. Looney, Obstacles to Recovery in Defective Seed
Cases- Revisited, AGRIC. L. UPDATE, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 1, (discussing the recent
decision in Martin Rispens & Sons v. Hall Farms, 621 N.E.2d 1078 (Ind. 1993)).
61. See for example the anti-corporate farming laws in Minnesota, Missouri, and Nebraska, which prohibit corporations from becoming directly or indirectly engaged
in farming. MN. STAT. ANN. § 500.24 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 350 (Vernon 1991); NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8. These laws contrast with
the approach taken in IOWA CODE ANN. § 9H (West 1994) concerning corporate
farming, which addresses only the direct or indirect ownership of agricultural
land. For a discussion of some of the issues related to corporate farming laws and
contract production, see Keith D. Haroldson, Two Issues in CorporateAgriculture:
AnticorporateFarmingStatutes and ProductionContracts, 41 DAKE L. Rav. 393
(1992).
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ownership of the crop, it could be seen as being directly engaged in
agriculture, which may be illegal under such laws.
Due to concerns about avoiding potential liability, most contracts
employ language to limit liability, and courts have generally observed
such provisions. However, there is at least one line of recent court
opinions concerning the bailment issue which questions the true nature of contract production relations. In Peterson v. Conida Warehouses, Inc., 6 2 the Idaho Supreme Court had to decide whether a
contract between a tenant and a company could transfer the bean crop
in such a manner that the landlord did not have a right to receive a
portion of the crop in return for unpaid rent. The court held the landlord did have an interest, and in so doing it engaged in a review of
cases concerning seedsmen contracts as bailments. 63 In a special concurrence, Judge Bistline questioned the wisdom of treating a production contract as a bailment.
I submit that it is unrealistic to continue to indulge in the fiction that a bean,
which is irretrievably planted in the ground, and whose very existence as a
bean ceases as it turns into a plant, may be the subject of bailment, entitling
the supplier of the bean to claim all the beans produced from that plant. The
parties essentially have entered into a joint venture, with the seed company
supplying the seed beans, and the grower, here the Grimms, supplying the
land in which the beans may be planted, together with all the labor which
goes into planting, cultivating, harvesting, and hauling to the warehouse. The
Idaho court, in our Ferry Co. case, in quoting from the Montana Ferry Co.
case, came close to the right answer where it spoke of "a share of the net proceeds of the adventure." Here the grower's share was agreed upon at so much
per hundred-weight, which seems to be what he was to receive for services
rendered in the adventure, and not, by any stretch of the imagination, as
6 4 compensation for storing the beans one inch apart in rows in the ground.

If increased use of contracts for grain production results in an increase
in litigation, courts may have the opportunity to evaluate the true nature of the legal relations being created under such arrangements.
B. Inventory of Other Typical Provisions in Grain
Production Contracts
The preceding discussion has identified several legal issues in contract production, including the nature of the relation, pricing methods,
and the timing of payment. To understand more fully the potential
range of legal questions which can arise under grain production contracts, it is valuable to review other provisions typically found in such
contracts.
62. 575 P.2d 481 (Idaho 1978).
63. Id. at 483-84.
64. Id. at 485-86 (citation omitted). This opinion was recently cited in a dissent by
Judge Swanstrom in Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 814 P.2d 941, 94950 (Swanstrom, J. dissenting) (Idaho Ct. App. 1990), when he argued the bailment theory for interpreting seed production contracts should be rejected.
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1.

Title to the Crop

The contract provision relating to the title to the crop is important
for purposes of determining who has the right to the crop at which
times, a factor that can influence who bears the risk of loss or who can
claim a financial interest in the crop. Consider the following clause
from the Stokely Sweet Corn Contract:
TITLE TO SEED AND CROP: The title to the seed and the crops grown herefrom shall at all times be and remain in the Company, and the entire crop,
except as herein otherwise expressly provided, shall be delivered to the Com-

pany. The Contractor shall not acquire any right, title, or interest in or to the
seed furnished him nor the crops grown therefrom;
and his possession of the
65

seed and crop shall be that of a bailee only.
Some contract provisions concerning title to the crop are interesting because they attempt to establish the company's ownership of the
crop while at the same time attempting to place any risk of loss on the
producer until the crop is delivered. Consider the following provision
from the Beatrice Popcorn Contract:
Title, Risk of Loss: This Agreement is intended and understood by the parities to be effective when signed, and title to the growing popcorn crop shall
pass to the Company immediately upon the sowing of the seed. However, until delivery and acceptance by Company, all risk of loss, damage or deterioration to the crop shall be borne by Grower, and Grower assumes all
responsibility and liability incident to the planting,
growing, harvesting, stor66
age, shelling and delivery of the popcorn crop.

2.

Risk of Loss

As can be seen in the "title" provisions quoted above, the location of
the title will help determine who bears the risk of loss of any crop
failure. Some contracts, which do not call for passage of title until
delivery, do include provisions on risk of loss. For example, the
Fairview Farms Soybean Contract for the production of food grade
soybeans provides:
Risk and Entry: Grower assumes all risk of loss of the Food Soybean crop
while growing and/or after harvest until such time as Fairview Farms Inc.
takes receipt thereof. Grower permits Fairview
Farms Inc. to take samples
67
from the field or the stored crop at any time.

3. Growing Obligations
Because grain production contracts are usually employed with
high value or specialty marketed crops, such as those for human food
consumption, the contracts commonly include specific provisions concerning how the crop must be raised. This is especially true in production arrangements such as Pioneer Hi-Bred's Better Life Grain
65. Stokely Sweet Corn Contract, supra note 49.
66. Beatrice Popcorn Contract, supra note 53.
67. Fairview Farms Soybean Contract, supra note 37.
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program where the additional price premium is in exchange for meeting a series of production standards requiring avoiding the use of pesticides.68 These obligations can also be reflected in the quality
standards incorporated in the pricing or acceptance provisions, such
as the standards for delivery of food grade soybeans quoted above.
The following is an example of a provision for growing obligations,
found in a Pioneer contract for the production of alfalfa seed.69
GROWING The Grower agrees to plant on land with proper crop history, to
grow, care for in a good and farmerlike manner, harvest and transport the
seed produced, except as otherwise expressly provided herein, according to the
rules and regulations of the Official Certifying Agency; provided, however,
that:
A. The Company, at its own expense, shall have the right to enter upon
the land, "rogue" and do such work as it deems advisable for the betterment of the crop for seed purposes without any liability for damage, if any,
to the crop resulting therefrom; and further provided that:
B. If at any time the Grower shall, in the Company's opinion, neglect,
refuse, or for any other reason fail to carry out his obligations hereunder,
the Company may, at the Grower's expense, use any means it deems necessary to properly care for, harvest, and7 0transport the crop and otherwise
complete the terms of this Agreement.

4.

Owner Approval of Contract:No Other Liens

Another common provision in crop production contracts concerns
the rights of third parties to the crop. The issue can involve either the
claims of the landlord for rent, if the crop is produced on rented
ground, or the claims of third party lienholders, such as banks which
might have financed production of the crop. The Pioneer Alfalfa Seed
Contract addresses the issues in the following clause:
OWNER'S APPROVAL OF CONTRACT
The Owner's approval of this contract is required when the Grower is not
the Owner of the seed field. Therefore, the undersigned, being the Owner(s) of
the premises heretofore described, does hereby consent to the foregoing contract and agrees that the rights of the Company under said contract shall be
superior to any landlord's lien or other lien which the undersigned has, or may
grown on said premises from the stock
hereafter acquire, on the alfalfa crop
71
seeds furnished by the Company.

The bailment provision of the Du Pont High Oil Corn Contract includes a clause dealing with the rights of third parties. It provides,
68. "The grower will sign an affidavit attesting that no pesticides have been applied
to the soil or crop since the harvest of the previous crop and during the production season or while in storage." See Pioneer Better Life Soybean Contract, supra
note 8.
69. Alfalfa Seed Contract, Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., Agri-Con Div. [hereinafter Pioneer Alfalfa Seed Contract].
70. Id.
71. Id.
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"GROWER agrees not to grant or cause to be placed any lien or claim
against TOPCROSS material."72
5. Entire Agreement
One provision found almost universally in grain production contracts is a clause providing the written contract is the entire agreement between the parties. The purpose of such a clause is to prevent
subsequent attempts by growers to use oral modifications or other evidence to argue the terms of the agreement had been modified by the
parties. The following is the integration clause contained in a corn
73
contract:
This agreement constitutes the entire understanding between the parties
hereto. Except as set forth elsewhere herein, Neither (sic) Buyer nor Seller
has any authority to alter, modify or assign this agreement or any part hereof
without the prior written consent of the other party. No such alteration or
modification shall be effective unless in writing and signed by the parties
hereto. Any assignment made without such consent shall be null and void
parties hereto, their
and of no effect. This agreement shall bind each of the 74
heirs, administrators, executors, successors and assigns.

6. Choice of Law
Grain production contracts generally include a clause designed to
select the forum for the resolution of any disputes which might arise.
Not surprisingly, the provisions commonly designate the home state
and county of the company as the applicable forum. For example, the
Beatrice Popcorn Contract includes the following provision:
Choice of Law/Jurisdiction: This Agreement shall be construed and performed under the laws of the State of Indiana. The courts of Indiana, County
of White, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the parties in any action relating to the subject matter or interpretation of this Agreement. 7 5

7. Incorporationof Other Laws
Many production contracts include provisions providing that other
laws apply to the agreement. The other laws incorporated into grain
production contracts may range from an agreement requiring the
grower to comply with all environmental laws and worker protection
requirements, to the statement the contract will be interpreted under
the terms of the UCC. For example, the Du Pont High Oil Corn Contract states: "This Agreement shall be interpreted in accordance with
the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted by the state of residence of
72. Du Pont High Oil Corn Contract.
73. 1992-93 Waxy Corn Contract used by Farmer Cooperative Co. of Aurelia, Iowa
[hereinafter referred to as the Farmer Coop. Corn Contract].
74. Id.
75. Beatrice Popcorn Contract, supra note 53.
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GROWER."76 These clauses are important because they may obligate
the grower to complying with laws which might not be applicable in a
normal farming venture. An example of a considerably more detailed
"incorporation of other laws" clause is found in the Beatrice Popcorn
Contract.
Employment Standards: Grower agrees all popcorn contracted herein was or
will be grown in accordance with the applicable provisions of Sections 6, 7 and
12 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, and the regulations

and orders of the United States Department of Labor issued under Section 14
thereof, and agrees, whenever applicable, to comply with § 202(1) to (7), inclusive, of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended by Executive Order No.
11375, and regulations thereunder, the provisions and regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
and all other applicable regulations, including Affirmative Action for Handi-

capped Workers, 41 CFR § 60-741.4, and Affirmative Action for Disabled Veterans of the Viet Nam Era, 41 CFR § 60-250.4, and Public Law 95-507,
Utilization of Small Business Concerns and Small Business Concerns Owned
and Controlled by Socially and Economically Disadvantaged Individuals, as
the same may be amended from time to time, and all of which are hereby
incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein. Grower agrees that
he will furnish the Company with written certification of such compliance
or
either ten (10) days after final delivery, prior to final payment hereunder,
77
at any other time during the term hereof when requested by Company.

It may be fair to ask, without questioning the good intentions of any of
the referenced laws, how informed any farmer's agreement to be
bound by such laws is, given the fact most farmers have no idea what
the laws require or how to find out. This raises a question about the
effect of the grower's promise of compliance and certification. However, inclusion of such detailed incorporation clauses illustrates how
entering grain production contracts may bring on unintended obligations and consequences of uncertain magnitude for farmers.
8. Other Miscellaneous Provisions
An inventory of grain production contracts reveals there are a variety of other clauses which might be found, including provisions relating to severability, no waiver, attorney fees, disclaimer of warranties,
intervening event or force majeure, dispute resolution, and length of
contract and termination. While these provisions are not reviewed in
this Article, each of the different clauses carries with it potential legal
effects if a dispute should arise.
III. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL LEGAL ISSUES UNDER GRAIN
PRODUCTION AND MARKETING CONTRACTS
The provisions discussed in the preceding section raise a variety of
legal questions which might need to be resolved if a dispute develops
76. Du Pont High Oil Corn Contract, at para. 8.
77. Beatrice Popcorn Contract, supra note 53.

1994]

PRODUCTION CONTRACTS

concerning a grain production contract. The following discussion analyzes several matters which could arise in grain contracting disputes.
A.

Issues From the Application of Article 2 of the UCC

The application of Article 2 of the UCC to most grain production
contracts means a variety of traditional issues of contract law may
arise. The most likely include whether the farmer is a merchant for
purposes such as warranties and notification, accord and satisfaction
in the acceptance of payment, notice of anticipatory breach, the measure of damages for a breach, and the duty to mitigate damages. Each
of these issues has been the subject of litigation involving contract production and marketing of grain. The following discussion illustrates
how courts have resolved the issues.
1.

The Farmeras a Merchant

A party's status as a merchant can influence many issues under
the UCC, including whether or not there is a warranty of
merchantability associated with the sale of goods and the rules which
apply to determine if a contract offer has been accepted. Courts have
divided on the issue of whether a farmer is a merchant. In ColoradoKansas Grain Co. v. Reifschneider,78 the issue was whether or not the
statute of frauds applied so the oral agreement between the farmer
and the company for the sale of grain did not create a contract. The
court held the farmer was a merchant and thus the written confirmation from the company was sufficient to establish the contract. 79 As a
merchant, the farmer had ten days to object to the written notice of
confirmation. On the issue of whether the farmer was a merchant, the
court defined a merchant as one "who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction
"80 The court said that if a transaction is one between merchants
then "both parties are chargeable with knowledge or skill of
merchants" under section 2-104(3).83 The Colorado court cited the
cases which held that farmers may be merchants, recognizing "the fact
that today's farmer is involved in far more than simply planting and
harvesting crops. Indeed, many farmers possess an extensive knowledge and sophistication regarding the purchase and sale of crops on
the various agricultural markets. Often, they are more aptly described as agri-businessmen."82 The issue of whether a farmer is a
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

817 P.2d 637 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 641.
Id. at 639 (citing CoLo. REv. STAT. § 4-2-104(1)).
Id. at 639.
Id. at 640.
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merchant is a fact for the trier. The court in Reifschneider looked at a
number of relevant factors, including (1) the length of time the farmer
had been engaged in the practice of selling his product to marketers of
his product; (2) the degree of business acumen shown by the farmer in
his dealing with other parties; (3) the farmer's awareness of the operation and existence of farm markets; and (4) the farmer's past experience with, or knowledge of, the customs and practices which 8 are
3
unique to the particular marketing of the product which he sells.

Another case holding a farmer is a merchant in the sale of commodities is Agrex, Inc. v. Schrant.8 4 The case involved a typical situation where a grower agreed to a forward contract for the sale of grain,
and then the market went up. When the grower decided not to perform the contract the buyer had to enter the market and buy grain at
a higher price. The buyer then sued to recover the damages. The
legal issues were similar to those in the Colorado case and centered on
whether the statute of frauds applied to the contract and the effect of
the farmer's failure to reply to the written confirmation. The court
ruled the contract was enforceable and the farmer was a merchant.
We therefore hold that experienced grain producers who regularly grow and
market grain on the open market as the principal means of providing for their
livelihood, and by reason of such occupation have acquired and possess knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices and operation of grain marketing, are
within the meaning of Neb. UCC 2-104 and 2-201 (Reissue
merchants
85
1980).

Courts in Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Illinois, and
Texas have all determined farmers may be merchants.
But the view that a farmer is a merchant is not universal. Courts
in other jurisdictions, including Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas,
South Dakota, and Utah have ruled farmers do not become merchants
simply by selling commodities they produce. For example, the Iowa
Supreme Court ruled a farmer was not a merchant in Sand Seed Service, Inc., v. Poeckes.8 6 The Iowa court looked at factors of the farmer's
experience, such as that he did not deal in crops on the market but
just sold what he raised, or that he had no business experience and
only a high school education. The court set out a three prong test for
when a farmer might be a merchant: (1) the farmer must be a dealer
who deals in the goods of the kind involved; (2) the farmer must by his
occupation hold himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices or goods involved in the transaction; or (3) the farmer
must employ an agent, broker, or other intermediary who by his occu83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
221 Neb. 604, 379 N.W.2d 751 (1986).
Id. at 608, 379 N.W.2d at 754.
249 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 1977).
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pation holds himself our as having knowledge8or
skill peculiar to the
7
practices or goods involved in the transaction.
Just a few years later, the Iowa court ruled that a farmer might be
a merchant, depending on the facts of the transaction. In Dotts v. Bennett,8 8 the court had to resolve a claim for damages made by the owner

of cattle which died from eating hay purchased from the producer.
The case involved two issues. The first issue was whether the buyer
was relying on the seller's skill in purchasing the hay for purposes of
establishing a breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.S9 The hay was later determined to contain mycotoxins which
killed several cattle. The second issue was whether the seller was a
merchant for purposes of an implied warranty of merchantability.90
On the first issue, the court found no evidence of the required reliance
and ruled it had been an error to consider that issue.91 On the second
issue, concerning an implied warranty of merchantability, the court
held that substantial evidence supported the jury finding that the defendant was a merchant of hay as regarded the buyer.9 2 The court
held the instruction given the jury
on the merchant issue was insuffi93
cient and remanded the matter.
2. Accord and Satisfaction in the Acceptance of Payment
Another typical UCC sales issue concerns the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction. This issue arises when one party claims that an accepted payment has served to resolve a dispute. A recent Wisconsin
case involving contract production of sweet corn illustrates the application of this doctrine. In Myron Soik & Sons v. Stokely USA, Inc., 94
growers of sweet corn brought a class action suit against Stokely over
interpretation of their production contracts. The dispute arose over
the amount farmers were paid for "passed acres," which are crop acres
fit for harvest but not taken by Stokely. The contract specified growers would be paid for passed acres from a fund created with contributions from growers and the company based on the total tons of
harvested crop. The contract provided if the fund was not sufficient to
provide full compensation of nonharvested acres the payments would
be prorated. Following harvest, the company notified growers the
fund was insufficient for full compensation and the payments would
be prorated on a calculation not yet determined. Shortly thereafter a
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 666.
382 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 1986).
Id. at 87.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id. at 90.
498 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:48

second letter and checks prorating payments at 53.49% were sent to
growers. At this point, the growers initiated action against Stokely on
the basis the payments were inadequate; however, some of the plaintiffs cashed the checks. Stokely raised the defense that the checks had
been calculated under terms of the contract so when growers accepted
them it operated as an accord and satisfaction of the contract. 95
Stokely moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs who
had accepted the checks. The trial court denied summary judgment
after concluding Stokely could not use accord and satisfaction as a defense.96 The court of appeals reversed and remanded. 9 7 The appellate court concluded there was a dispute at the time the checks were
cashed and the letters and correspondence gave growers notice the
checks were meant as full payment for passed acres. 98 The court
ruled Stokely could use accord and satisfaction as a defense, even
though the letter accompanying the check made no specific reference
to the provision or to the effect cashing the check would have on a
grower's right to bring a subsequent claim. 9 9 The state of Wisconsin
subsequently enacted administrative rules which limit the ability of a
company to use passed acres clauses.100
3. Notice of Anticipatory Breach
Another issue which can arise in the production and marketing of
grain under contract is what happens if the producer gives the company notice of an intention not to perform under the contract. For
example, a producer could refuse to deliver grains which have been
forward marketed. The issue involves questions both as to the appropriate amount of damages and what the buyer should do once it has
knowledge of the grower's intention to breach the agreement. A recent Nebraska Court of Appeals case, TrinidadBean and Elevator Co.
v. Frosh,o1involved a dispute between a Colorado bean buyer, which
operated an elevator in Nebraska, and a farmer. On April 26, 1988,
Elmo Frosh contracted with the Trinidad Bean and Elevator Co. in
Imperial to sell 1,875 hundredweights of edible dry beans. The contract included two payment options. Option one provided for payment
of $16.25 per hundredweight on January 15, 1989. Option two provided for fifty percent payment at sixteen dollars per hundredweight
upon the completion of harvest and for fifty percent at sixteen dollars
per hundredweight on December 1, 1988. Choice of the first option
95. Id. at 898.
96. Id. at 899.
97. Id. at 901.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See infra text accompanying note 142.
101. 494 N.W.2d 347 (Neb. App. 1992).
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would allow a grower to defer income for tax purposes; however, both
payment options were inadvertently marked on the contract with
Frosh. When the contract was reviewed by the Denver office of Trinidad, the company contacted him about the need to determine which
payment option he desired so the contract could be processed. After
communication from the local elevator about correcting the error,
Frosh returned to the elevator in early May 1988, and told them to
tear up the contract. At that time the contract price and market price
for dry beans were the same. When Frosh returned to the elevator on
August 31, 1988, to make sure the contract had been torn up, he was
informed the elevator still expected delivery. When he failed to deliver the beans, the elevator sued for the damages it experienced in
buying beans, now at double the May price, because of a drought.
The jury found Frosh had violated the contract but was not responsible for any damages because the elevator knew in May he was not
going to perform. 10 2 The appellate court affirmed, holding the contract was repudiated in May when there was no difference between
the contract and market price.O3 Under section 2-713(1) of the UCC,
the court determined that upon the anticipatory repudiation the measure of damages for nondelivery or repudiation was the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the
breach and the contract price. O4 The elevator could not wait until the
drought had driven prices higher and try to collect from Frosh. Instead it was limited to the damages from the difference of price in
early May, when there was no difference. If there is a lesson in the
case, it appears to be that if a party believes it has ended a contract to
deliver commodities, it is important to make a record of the action and
confirm that the buyer knows of the decision.
4. Measure of Damages for Breach
The issue of what measure of damages to apply in a breach of contract action is not simple, as noted by the court in Frosh.105 Under
section 2-711(1), the buyer may cancel the contract and recover any
amount paid, as well as seek damages for cover under section 2-712.
This option is in addition to the one followed by the Trinidad Bean
Co.-to choose not to cover and instead seek damages for the contractmarket differential under section 2-713(1).
A recent Kansas case concerns the application of this provision. In
Tongish v. Thomas,10 6 Tongish had a contract with a local cooperative
to grow 160 acres (later modified to 116.8 acres) of sunflower seeds
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 349.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 352-53.
840 P.2d 471 (Kan. 1992).
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and sell the crop to the cooperative for thirteen dollars per hundredweight for large seeds and eight dollars per hundredweight for smaller
seeds. The cooperative had a contract to deliver the seed to Bambino
Bean & Seed, Inc. at the same prices as Tongish was to be paid. The
cooperative was to receive a fifty-five cent per hundredweight handling fee which was to be the cooperative's only profit under the agreement. The crop was to be delivered in one-third increments by
December 31, 1988, March 31, 1989, and May 31, 1989. In January
1989, a dispute arose between Tongish and the cooperative because it
was mixing Tongish's high quality seed with other seed. At that time
the price for sunflower seeds was increasing because of weather and
other factors. Tongish notified the cooperative he would not be delivering any more sunflower seeds. In May 1989, Tongish sold his remaining seed to Danny Thomas for twenty dollars per hundredweight.
Tongish was paid by Thomas for approximately half of his seed. A
dispute arose over who the seed belonged to, leading Tongish to sue
Thomas for the remaining payment. Thomas deposited the money
with the court to determine who it should go to, and the cooperative
107
intervened, seeking damages for Tongish's breach of contract.
The district court had to decide whether the damages should be
determined by actual losses or the difference between market and contract prices. It found Tongish had breached the contract and awarded
the cooperative $455.51, or the amount it had lost in handling fees
concerning the crop. 10 8 The court of appeals reversed and ordered
that damages be determined by the difference between the market
price and the contract price as required by Kansas law.1O9 The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the "court of appeals, ruling the contract
between Tongish and the cooperative obligated the cooperative to take
the seeds whether or not it had a market for them.11o The court therefore disregarded the fact that the cooperative had protected itself from
market fluctuations through a subsequent contract to sell the seeds
with a handling fee as profit. The court held the majority rule of market damages "encourages a more efficient market and discourages the
breach of contracts."'1 1
107. Id. at 472.

108. Id.
109. 829 P.2d 916, 919 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-713
(1993)).
110. 840 P.2d 471 (Kan. 1992).
111. Id. at 476. The issue of the measure of damages also arises in connection with
claims for breach of warranties. For an example of a grain marketing contract
dispute involving claims for damages for breach of express warranty, in this case
for delivery of spring wheat which was to be sold for seed, but which turned out to
be winter wheat, see Dakota Grain Co. v. Ehrmantrout, 502 N.W.2d 234 (N.D.
1993).

1994]

PRODUCTION CONTRACTS

5. Oral Modifications of Contracts
Another important issue which can arise in grain production contracts is the effect of oral modifications which are made once the production relation is underway. The question of how to deal with oral
modifications involves several issues already addressed, including the
effect of an integration clause, or provision in the contract noting that
only written modifications are effective, and the question of the application of the statute of frauds.
A recent Illinois case involved oral modifications of a grain production contract. In Neibert v. Schwenn Agri-Production Corp.,112 the
Neiberts, Illinois farmers, contracted with Schwenn in 1986 to grow
sunflowers on 612 acres and sell the seed to Schwenn's corporation.
The corporation agreed to supply seed, pesticide, herbicide, and pick
up seed from the farmer's storage. In exchange, the Neiberts would
raise and harvest the crop and receive twelve cents per pound for
seeds larger than 17/64th of an inch. After four loads of the harvested
seed had been picked up, the Neiberts received their first payment
and were surprised they were not paid for more of the seed. The company's position was that much of the seed was too small and was being
priced at the lower rate. Negotiations began between the parties
which involved the Neiberts flying to North Dakota for discussions
about possible price reforms in the contract. The Neiberts left the negotiations believing the agreement had been modified so they would
be paid ten cents per pound for small seed. Schwenn claimed he
agreed only to pay for the small seed that had been delivered and for
the first load following the negotiation meeting. In October 1986,
Schwenn sent a letter to the Neiberts informing them further deliveries would be paid for under the original contract with no amendment. Schwenn claimed the Neiberts then said they would not deliver
any more seed as of October 26. The Neiberts requested guarantees of
payment in November, but Schwenn covered the contracts by purchasing sunflower seeds from other producers.
The Neiberts brought suit in March 1987 against Schwenn for
breach of contract, and Schwenn counterclaimed, also for breach of
contract. The trial court found the Neiberts had breached the contract
since the contracts were not modified following the meetings in September. The Neiberts appealed, but the appellate court upheld the
trial court's finding that the Neiberts were the party that breached the
contract.113 The appellate court agreed with the trial court's assessment that any modification needed to be in writing, and that the
Neiberts breached the production contract.
112. 579 N.E.2d 389 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
113. Id. at 391.
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The suit also involved the question of the appropriate measure of
damages for the Neiberts' breach. Schwenn argued it had intended to
use the seed from the Neibert contract to satisfy a sales contract to
Dalhgren for one million pounds at seventeen cents per pound.
Schwenn argued that when the Neiberts refused to deliver more seed
the company filled the contract with seed raised under contract with
other growers. The trial court adopted Schwenn's method for determining damages and set damages at the figure of seventeen cents per
undelivered pound of seed. The appellate court reversed the trial
court's findings and looked to the UCC for guidance in assessing damages. The court found the proper measure of damages was the difference between the cost of covering the breach and the twelve cents per
pound to be paid under the Neiberts' contract."1 4 The court ruled
Schwenn would have to show what was paid for the seed used to cover
the Dahlgren contracts before the damages owed could be assessed."15
The trial court also had included trucking costs and damages from disputes concerning how much seed and chemicals were used. The appellate court disallowed the trucking costs and found the Neiberts did not
owe damages for chemicals they had correctly applied. The court also
ruled the Neiberts owed Schwenn for ten bags of seed that were not
6
used to plant or replant the 612 acres under the contract."1
B. Beneficial Interest Rules Under Federal Farm Programs
Another area of potential concern for growers using grain production contracts is the impact the contracts might have on their eligibility to participate in various federal farm programs. The question here
is whether the producer has retained a sufficient property interest in
the crop so as to be eligible to receive farm program benefits or place
the crop into the commodity price support loan program. Under the
federal regulations which determine eligibility of producers to place
commodities under price support loans, "a producer must have the
beneficial interest in the commodity which is tendered to the CCC for
a loan, loan deficiency payment, or purchase."117 The rules provide
that in determining whether a producer retains a beneficial interest,
it may be necessary to determine if the crop was produced or marketed
under a production contract. In such cases, the following test applies:
A producer shall not be considered to have divested the beneficial interest in
the commodity if the producer retains control of the commodity, including the
right to make all decisions regarding the tender of such commodity to CCC for
price support, and the producer:
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 393.
Id.
Id. at 393-94.
7 C.F.R. § 1421.5(c)(1) (1993).

1994]

PRODUCTION CONTRACTS

(i) Executes an option to purchase, whether or not an advance payment is
made by the potential buyer with respect to such commodity if the option to
purchase contains the following provision:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this option to purchase, title; risk of
loss; and beneficial interest in the commodity, as specified in 7 CFR part 1421,
shall remain with the producer until the buyer exercises this option to
purchase the commodity. This option to purchase shall expire, notwithstanding any action or inaction by either the producer or the buyer, at the earlier of:
(1) The maturity of any Commodity Credit Corporation price support loan
which is secured by such commodity;, (2) the date the Commodity Credit Corporation claims title to such commodity; or (3) such other date as provided in
this option." or
(ii) Enters into a contract to sell the commodity if the producer retains
title, risk of loss, and beneficial interest in the commodity and the purchaser
does not pay to the producer any advance payment amount or any incentive
payment amount
to enter into such contract except as provided in part 1425 of
1 18
this title.

If farm program eligibility, such as the opportunity to receive deficiency payments, is an important part of a producer's calculation in
entering a contract, it will be important to determine if the terms of
the contract relating to matters such as the risk of loss, passage of
title, and timing and method of payment leave the grower with sufficient beneficial interest.
C.

Agricultural Fair Practices Protections

Federal and state laws have been enacted to protect the rights of
producers to organize and bargain when marketing commodities. The
laws, in particular the Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1968119
(AFPA), have been used by poultry producers to challenge the manner
in which their contracts were terminated.1 2 0 Congress passed the
AFPA to protect the right of farmers and ranchers to join with other
growers to form associations to bargain for better prices and terms
with handlers and processors. The Act sets out a number of prohibited practices for handlers, or persons engaged in "contracting... with
... producers.., with respect to production or marketing of any agricultural product .. .. "121 The Act focuses on prohibiting handlers
from discriminating against, or intimidating, producers because of
their membership in, or exercise of their right to organize, associations of growers.
118. Id. § 1421.5(c)(2).
119. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2305 (1988).
120. For a discussion of the impact of contracts on poultry production, see Clay
Fulcher, Vertical Integration in the Poultry Industry: The ContractualRelationship, AGRIC. L. UPDATE, Jan. 1992, at 4. An excellent source of information on
developments with litigation involving poultry production contracts is the Poultry
GrowersNews, published by the National Contract Poultry Growers Association,
P.O. Box 824, Ruston, LA 71273.
121. 7 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (1988).
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The Act was relied on by the federal courts in Baldree v. Cargill,

Inc.,12 2 a suit brought by Florida poultry producers alleging the de-

fendant terminated their poultry contracts in response to efforts to organize other Florida growers. In Baldree, the Florida Poultry Growers
Association and the U.S. Department of Justice sought a preliminary
injunction forcing Cargill to reinstate its growers agreement with Arthur Gaskins, president and organizer of the association. The federal
district court granted the preliminary injunction because it found
there was a substantial likelihood the Growers Association and the
Department would succeed in showing the agreement was terminated
by Cargill. Specifically, the court found there was a substantial likelihood Cargill had attempted to discourage and prevent Gaskins from
supporting the Association and to hamper the Association's claim
against Cargill without economic justification in an unfair and unjustly discriminatory manner. The court cited the Packers and Stockyards Act123 and the Agricultural Fair Practices Act124 as authority
for its decision. The dispute underlying the case concerned a suit Gaskins and other growers had filed against Cargill alleging various
forms of fraudulent practices such as misweighing.
The importance of a statute such as the AFPA and cases such as
Baldree in the context of grain production contracts is that such protections might become important if growers decide they need to organize to bargain for better contract terms. One result of contract
production and agricultural industrialization may even be the need for
farmers to consider collective action on a parallel to organized labor.
Thomas Urban recognized this when he wrote:
We may even see farmers organize with like members of a system, or systems,

as labor did at the turn of the century, to protect their interests in the face of
contracts perceived to be unfair. They will certainly ask for, and receive, leg125
islative protection at state and federal levels as labor has done in the past.

D. State Regulation of Contracting
One response to the increased use of agricultural contracts has
been that a number of states have considered legislation designed to
protect agricultural producers who enter production contracts. The
most important legislation has been enacted in Minnesota. The state
has enacted several laws in recent years to go along with the existing
anti-corporate farming statute which prohibits both farming and the
ownership of agricultural land by corporations. One law amends the
Minnesota Packers and Stockyards Act by placing reporting require122.
123.
124.
125.

925 F.2d. 1474 (11th Cir. 1991) aff'g, 758 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1988).
7 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2306 (1988).
Urban, supra note 19 at 5.

1994]

PRODUCTION CONTRACTS

ments on packers and stockyard owners. 12 6 They must now include in
their annual report to the Commissioner of Agriculture "a copy of each
contract a packer has entered into with a livestock producer and each
agreement that will become part of the contract that a packer has with
a livestock producer for the purchase or contracting of livestock."127
Packers and grain and feed businesses with annual sales over $10 million are required to keep a separate account for transactions relating
to contract feeding of hogs, cattle, or sheep. The account may be audited at any time by the Commissioner of Agriculture.
A second law, enacted by Minnesota in 1990,128 is the only state
statute to date which directly regulates the provisions of agricultural
production contracts. The legislation was the result of a report prepared by the "Agricultural Contracts Task Force" which was created
by the 1988 Minnesota Legislature to explore the subject. The task
force met fifteen times in preparing its report, which included a series
of legislative proposals.129 The law enacted as a result of this task
force effort establishes a number of requirements for all "agricultural
0
contracts," including the following requirements.13
1. Dispute resolution: The law requires that a "contract for an
agricultural commodity between a contractor and a producer must
contain language providing for resolution of contract disputes by
3
either mediation or arbitration."' '
2. Recovery of investment: When a producer is required by contract "to make a capital investment in buildings or equipment that
cost $100,000 or more and have a useful life of five or more years," the
contractor must not cancel or terminate the contract until:
the producer has been given written notice of the intention to terminate or
cancel the contract at least 180 days before the effective date of the termination or cancellation... [except when the producer abandons the contract or is
convicted of an offense related to the contract business], and the producer has
been reimbursed for damages incurred by an investment in buildings or
equipment that was
made for the purpose of meeting minimum requirements
1 32
of the contract.

3. Right to cure: If the producer breaches the contract, the contractor must give the producer sixty days to correct his breach and
ninety days written notice before terminating the agreement.13 3
126.
127.
128.
129.

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 31B.03 (West Supp. 1994).

Id.
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.90-17.98, 514.945 (West 1994).
See AGRicuLTuuRu
CoNTRACTs TASK FORCE, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTuRE, FMINAL REPORT TO THE 1990 LEGISLATURE, (Feb. 1990).

130. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.90-17.98 (West. 1994).

131. Id. § 17.91.
132. Id. § 17.92.
133. Id.
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4. Parent company liability: Parent companies of subsidiaries licensed to purchase agricultural commodities are "liable to a seller for
the amount of any unpaid claim or contract performance claim if the
contractor fails to pay or perform according to the terms of the
34
contract."1
5. Implied promise of good faith: All agricultural contracts must
be interpreted by the courts as including a statutory implied promise
of good faith. If the court finds there has been a violation of the implied promise of good faith, the court may allow the party to recover
35
"damages, court costs, and attorney fees."1
6. Return of prepayments: If a producer makes prepayments "for
agricultural production inputs that include but are not limited to seed,
feed, fertilizer, pesticides, or fuel for future delivery, the producer may
demand a letter of credit or bank guarantee from the provider of the
13 6
inputs to ensure reimbursement if delivery does not occur."
The law creates a position within the Department of Agriculture
"to provide information, investigate complaints arising from this chapter, and provide or facilitate dispute resolutions" relating to contract
production.1 37 The law also authorizes the Department to adopt rules
to implement the various contracting provisions.'3 8 In 1991, the Department adopted rules pursuant to this chapter.13 9 The rules provide further guidance on the interpretation of the provisions. One
requirement added by the rules is that contractors using written commodity contracts must submit samples of contracts they propose to offer producers for review by the Department at least thirty days prior
to offering the contracts to producers for signature.
Another Minnesota law, enacted in 1990, creates an agricultural
0
producer's lien for products produced by an agricultural producer.14
The lien is perfected by delivery of the agricultural commodity and is
good for twenty days after delivery. It may be extended by filing
within the twenty days but is void six months after filing. The agricultural producer's lien has priority over all other liens and encumbrances in the commodity. The lien extends to proceeds from the
commodity, the proportionate share of commingled commodity, and
14
products manufactured from the commodity. 1
Another example of state regulation of certain aspects of production contracts is Wisconsin's rules regulating use of passed acres
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. § 17.93.
Id. § 17.94.
Id. § 17.97.
Id. § 17.95.
Id. § 17.945.
Minnesota Administrative Code, Chapter 1573, Department of Agriculture - Agricultural Contracts.
140. MiNN.STAT. ANN.§ 514.945 (West 1994).
141. Id.
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clauses in vegetable production agreements. The rules restrict use of
such clauses, regulate the method of funding payment pools, and require companies to pay the full contract price for passed acres which
were suitable for harvest.142
The question whether state legislation will be needed to regulate
the use of production contracts will largely be determined by the experience farmers have with such relations. This section of the Article
has clearly demonstrated there is a significant potential for legal issues to arise in connection with contract production. To have a more
complete understanding of why production contracts are becoming
more common ingrain production, it is necessary to consider the legal
issues relating to the ownership and patenting of seeds and plant genetic materials. This is the focus of the next section.
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CROP
PRODUCTION CONTRACTS
The preceding section reviewed changes in grain production and
the development of contract production. The trend toward contract
production is directly related to development of improved plant genetics which can produce high value crops and grains genetically engineered for special uses. There is also a direct link between the trend
toward contract production and the intellectual property right protections available for agricultural crops. As genetic engineering and improved breeding creates the potential for added value in grains, it is
only natural for the companies investing millions of dollars to develop
new crops to want to protect their financial interests in what they create. Companies will look for ways to claim rights further out of the
production flow of a crop in order to capture part or all of the value
they contribute. That is why companies such as Du Pont have decided
to enter directly into the production of grain by opening subsidiaries
engaged in contract production.
It is increasingly clear seed companies will not be content to simply
sell improved seeds and profit from the higher prices charged. Instead, they may look for ways to control production of value-added
crops so a portion or all of the enhanced value added by their breeding
goes to them. Companies can do this in several ways. First, they can
own or rent land and raise the crop themselves, but this is costly and
even illegal for some companies in many midwestern states. Second,
the companies could sell the seed to farmers and then buy back the
production in the open marketplace for further distribution. If farmers can save the seed and replant it, however, this method risks losing
142. Wis. ADrnm. CODE § Dept. of Agriculture, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 99
and 101. See Ag 101: New Vegetable ContractRule Benefits the Industry, THE
BADGER COMION'TATER, Jan. 1993, at 5.
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control over the specially tailored genetics, which in turn could reduce
the company's future ability to sell the seeds and capture their added
value. Open sale of the improved seeds may also result in the extra
value being lost if the public marketplace did not provide a way to
value the additional traits. In such a case, poultry growers who buy
high-oil corn might get a better quality feed ingredient without having
to pay anyone for the improvement. A third approach is to contract
with farmers to raise the crops and then sell them exclusively to the
company for further marketing. This, of course, was the subject of the
preceding discussion. In order to protect their interests in both the
improved genetics and their ability to maximize the financial gains
from the products, companies will utilize whatever laws are available.
The laws which are most directly applicable are those for protecting
intellectual property claims in seeds and plants. 143 As a result, the
increased use of contract production in grain requires consideration of
the existing range of intellectual property right protections available
along with the emerging legal issues in their use.
A.

Intellectual Property Rights for Seeds and Plants in the
United States

The question of who will benefit from improved plant genetics will
be in part determined by the forms of intellectual property rights
available to those who create new plants. The United States is most
advanced in applying the full range of intellectual property protections to living materials, including plants. Plant breeders have several options for protecting a new variety developed through traditional
plant breeding or through biotechnology. The following are the different forms of intellectual property protections available to plant breeders and seed companies in the United States.
1. Plant Variety Protection Certificates: Plant breeders of new
sexually reproducing varieties may claim "breeders rights" under the
Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA).144 This approach is most commonly used for cross or self pollinating crops such as wheat and soybeans. The rights are sometimes referred to as patents but they are
not true patents.
143. This was the topic of a conference held in Washington D.C. in January 1993,
sponsored by the Crop Science Society of America. The proceedings of the conference were recently published in CROP SCIENCE SociETY OF AMERICA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROTECTION OF PLANT MATERIALS, CSSA SPECIAL
PUBLICATION #21 (1993).
144. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1988). See H.R. REP. No. 1605, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5082. For a discussion of the law, see
Scott D. Wegner, The Plant Variety ProtectionAct: Has the FarmerExemption
Swallowed the Act?, AGRIC. L. UPDATE, Apr. 1992, at 4.
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2. Plant patents: Plant breeders and companies who develop or
find asexually reproducing plants, those reproduced using cuttings or
scions of the original such as fruit trees, can claim a plant patent
under the 1930 Plant Patent Act (PPA).145 This Act, the first legal
protection for plant breeders, was largely the work of an industry committee led by Paul Stark of the Missouri nursery family. Passage of
the PPA was influenced by the difficulties experienced by famed plant
breeder Luther Burbank in obtaining commercial rewards for his
inventions.
3. Utility patents on plant varieties: The newest, and in some
ways most controversial, protection for new plant creations is the patent law (referred to as utility patents, to distinguish from plant patents). Under a 1985 decision of the United States Patent Office, Ex
Parte Hibberd,146 a plant breeder may obtain a utility patent on a
newly developed plant variety. The patent office decision to allow patenting of plant varieties was based on the 1980 United States
Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,147 approving
patenting of living organisms developed by genetic engineering. Since
these decisions, hundreds of patents have been issued for plant varieties. The application of United States patent law to plants has
moved rapidly. The most extreme application of plant patents is the
recent announcement by Agracetus, a Madison, Wisconsin based subsidiary of W.R. Grace, that it has received a patent for "all genetically
engineered cotton."148 In connection with announcing the broadbased patent, the Vice President of Finance for the company reportedly said "all transgenetic cotton products, regardless of which engineering technique is used, will have to be commercially licensed
through us before they can enter the marketplace."'149 The terms of
the patent are:
Cotton seed capable of germination into a cotton plant comprising in its genome a chimeric recombinant gene construction including a foreign gene and
promoter and control sequences operable in cotton cells, the chimeric gene
construction being effective in the cells of the cotton plant to express a cellular
product coded by the foreign gene, the cellular product imbuing the plant with
a detectable trait, the cellular product selected from the group consisting of a
foreign protein and a negative strand RNA.' 50

The claim could have a significant effect on cotton breeding programs,
especially the many efforts underway to genetically engineer cotton to
be resistant to various herbicides. If the patent is in fact determined
145.
146.
147.
148.

35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1988).
227 U.S.P.Q. (B.N.A.) 443 (1985).
447 U.S. 303 (1980).
Karol Wrage, Agracetus Claims Patent on 'All" Genetically Engineered Cotton:
The Beginning of First Big "Legal Monopolies" in Crop Development? AGBioTEcHNoLOGY NEWS, Dec. 1992, at 1.

149. Id. at 4.
150. U.S. Patent 5,159,135, c1 .1.
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to be as broad based as claimed and if future developments lead to
most U.S. cotton being genetically engineered in some way, then the
company could have a profound influence on the cotton market, similar to Polaroid's influence with instant processing cameras. While it
appears that such broad based patents are possible under U.S. patent
law, the fact they are granted does not mean they will not be subject to
challenge or limitation in actual application. 15 1
4. Trade secrets on hybrids: In addition to these formal mechanisms, plant breeders have more informal ways of protecting their inventions. For example, breeders of hybrid seed corn use the law of
trade secrets to protect the identity of their parent lines. This means
that by protecting the identity of the parent lines from other breeders,
companies can maintain control over the production of their hybrids.
In other words, farmers cannot save seed to plant and obtain the same
results because of the hybrid nature of the crop. The self-protecting
nature of hybrids is one reason seed companies have experimented for
years to hybridize other crops such as canola, cotton, wheat, and soybeans. With the exception of canola the efforts have been largely unsuccessful. In recent years there have been several highly publicized
lawsuits involving seed companies fighting over the ownership of par15 2
ent lines of hybrid corn.

5. Other contractual protections: Companies marketing improved genetics may also provide seed to producers under contractual
arrangements which commit the producer to not save or sell any of the
harvested crop as seed. Such clauses may be used in addition to the
protections found in the intellectual property laws, such as claims of
patent infringement, or may be used alone. Some companies in the
soybean business do not use the PVPA but instead rely on contractual
provisions to authorize them to use breach of contract claims in local
courts to enforce ownership of the seeds. The contractual claims concerning ownership of the seed are either included in the label when
the seed is sold, as is done with limited use licensing for computer
software, or on the purchase agreement.
An example of the inclusion of such a clause is the sales agreement
used by an Iowa seed producer. The front of the sale bill provides
"Terms on reverse side are a part of this Agreement. Read Carefully."15 3 The back of the agreement has several detailed provisions in

small print on matters such as limitation on warranties and a notice
151. See Control of Cotton: The Patentingof Transgenic Cotton, RAFI COMwmrQug
(Rural Advancement Foundation International) July-Aug. 1993.

152. For a discussion of litigation over ownership of seed lines in PioneerHi-Bred International, Inc. v. Holden Foundation Seeds, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 76 (N.D. Ind.
1985), see Note, The "Genetic Message" from the Cornfields of Iowa: Expanding
the Law of Trade Secrets, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 631 (1988-89).
153. See Stine Seed Company PurchaseAgreement (copy on file with NEBRASKA LAW
REVIEW).
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of required arbitration. The intellectual property related provision
reads:
Supplier represents and Purchaser hereby acknowledges that Supplier is engaged in the business of developing and supplying for sale various varieties of
seeds. Supplier has a substantial investment in the development and production of Stine Brand Seeds and in the use of the subsequent production of the
Stine Brand Seeds herein sold. Supplier has expended substantial effort in
developing a market for Stine Brand Seeds. Supplier has existing contractual
relationships with other purchasers and growers for the sale of Stine Brand
Seeds and expectations of additional contracts for the Sale of Stine Brand
Seeds in the future. In consideration of the foregoing and in consideration of
the Stine Brand Seeds herein sold, Purchaserhereby acknowledges and agrees
that the productionfrom the Stine Brand Seeds herein sold will be used only
for feed or processing and will not be used or sold for seed, breeding or any
variety improvement purposes. Purchaser acknowledges Supplier's proprietary
interest in the use of subsequent production from the seeds herein sold, and
agrees it would be a violation of this agreement to allow the subsequent production of the seed herein sold to be used to create a seed variety or seed
product from said production, which may be used for seed purposes by individuals or entities other than Stine Seed Company. Purchaser agrees and acknowledges that any use of Stine Brand Seeds, which is forbidden by this
agreement, will constitute a misappropriation of the personal property of
Stine Seed Company, and will therefore result in a breach of the agreement.
Purchaser agrees that Supplier may bring an action in Dallas County, Iowa,
to recover damages as a result of the breach of this agreement, along with
reasonable attorney fees and costs associated with any action commenced in
regard thereto. Purchaser agrees and acknowledges that any use of Stine
Brand Seeds forbidden by this agreement will damage Supplier's legitimate
expectation of future sales of seed and any use of Stine Brand Seeds in violation of this agreement will constitute an attempt to intentionally injure or
destroy Supplier's prospective business expectations in future sale of Stine
Brand Seeds. Purchaser agrees and acknowledges that any use of Stine
Brand Seeds in violation of this agreement will cause a substantial damage to
Stine Seed Company, and that if subsequent production of the seed herein
sold is used to create a seed variety or seed product a substantial damage to
Stine Seed Company for all seed varieties or seed products thereby created
rights,
legal or equiwill be caused. This agreement shall not limit any other15
4
table, that the Supplier have but shall be accumulative.

Restrictions on saving crops for future seed use are also commonly
found in production contracts under which growers raise specialty

crops for companies. For example, the following clause is from a contract used by an Iowa firm which contracts with farmers to raise spe-

cialty soybeans.
No Sales to Third Parties. Grower acknowledges that [company] has a valuable proprietary interest in the Parent Seed and Seed Crop. Grower agrees
that he will not use for seed except under this agreement, not sell to or permit
any other person to use for seed any of the Parent Seed or Seed Crop. Grower
acknowledges that the legal remedies for the event of any actual or threatened
breach of this covenant, in addition to any other right or remedy which [com154. Id.
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pany] may have, [company] shall be entitled to specific
enforcement of this
15 5
covenant through injunctive or other equitable relief.

Some production contract clauses are written to provide the grower
never has any ownership rights in the seed planted on the farm. For
example, the Pioneer Alfalfa Seed Contract provides, in part:
III. Stock Seed
A. The Grower agrees to accept, as a bailee, stock seed of -, for seeding at
the rate of - pounds per acre.
B. The grower agrees to return all unused stock seed to the Company within
two (2) months from the date of receipt by the grower.
VII.

General Terms

B. Title. The grower agrees:
1. That the stock seed furnished, the plant life produced and all seed grown
under this agreement are and at all times shall remain the property of the
Company,
2. That he will not use or sell nor permit any other person to use or sell for
seed any of the crops produced from the stock seed furnished by the Company,

3. That he will not allow any of the vegetative cuttings or plants from the
stock seed to be removed from his fields or control, except with express written
consent of the Company, and further
4. That he will not commit any act permitting any other party to obtain possession of1 5the
seed in anyway whatsoever except as provided for
6
hereunder.

B.

How Intellectual Property Protections Affect Farmers

From the view of farmers, the most important issue about the different forms of legal protections is how they affect what producers can
do with the seeds they raise. The most important issue is whether
there is a right to save seed from one crop year and plant it in another.
A related question is whether farmers can save protected seed and sell
it to other farmers. Another issue is what happens if a farmer violates
the law. The answer to these questions depends on two things: the
nature of the crop involved and the law under which the seed is protected. With regard to hybrids, it is clear there is little a farmer can
do with saved seed, as it will not breed true. In regard to seed sold
under a contract restricting its future use or sale, the issue is whether
the contract is enforceable. There have been few reported cases in the
United States concerning such clauses. The enforceability of such a
contract would depend on whether the buyer was aware of the provision and whether the courts would otherwise find it legal. The most
important legal questions for farmers relate to seeds protected under
the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) or under patents.
155. Soybean Seed Production Contract, Strayer Seed Farms, para. 17.
156. Pioneer Alfalfa Seed Contract, supra note 69.
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1. The Plant Variety ProtectionAct and Saved Seed
In 1970, Congress passed the PVPA and gave the developers of
novel plant varieties eighteen-year patent-like protection while creating a system for them to protect innovations from infringement. The
law was enacted to stimulate private breeding activities for sexually
reproducing crops such as soybeans by providing financial incentives
for plant breeders. Since its passage, over 2,000 PVPA certificates
have been issued. The Act is easy to use and plant breeders can complete the applications for a PVPA certificate without the services of a
patent attorney. The Act has played a significant role in increasing
private seed breeding activities in the United States.
a. PVPA Exemptions
An important aspect of the operation of the PVPA is the exemptions it contains. The most important are (1) a research exemption
which allows "bona fide research" on protected varieties;1 57 and (2) a
farmer exemption which gives farmers the right to save seed for future uses, and in some instances to sell saved seed to other farmers.158
In recent years the farmer exemption, also known as the crop exemption, has become very controversial to seed companies. Seed breeders
claim under the exemption farmers are able to purchase PVPA protected seed, raise a crop, and then sell significant amounts to other
farmers as seed, thus unfairly appropriating the research of the
breeder and stealing their markets.
b. Brown Bagging
The practice of farmers saving and selling first generation protected seed is commonly referred to as "brown bagging" and is a fairly
common, although unpublicized, practice in areas producing sexually
reproducing crops such as wheat, soybeans, and cotton. The potential
financial impact of brown bagging on seed research cannot be denied.
For example, in 1990, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., decided to
stop breeding hard red winter wheat in Kansas due to financial losses.
Statistics show that in 1989 only eight percent of acres planted with
Pioneer's variety 2157 were actually sold by Pioneer, the rest had been
brown bagged by other growers.' 5 9 As a result of incidents like this,
the American Seed Trade Association (ASTA) has led efforts to amend
the PVPA to limit the farmer exemption to allow only saving of seed
for planting on the farm and to prohibit sales of saved seed to other
farmers. However, Congress and the USDA (which administers the
157. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (1988).
158. Id. § 2543.
159. See Neil D. Hamilton, Who Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for the
Ownership of Plant Genetic Resources, 28 TuLSA L.J. 587, 632-33 n. 142 (1993).
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law) have not as yet passed amendments limiting the exemption. As a
result, the main avenue for seed breeders to defend their legal rights
in PVPA protected seed is to bring suit when they believe producers
have illegally infringed their rights.
c.

What the FarmerExemption Allows

The controversy over the PVPA concerns the application of the
farmer exemption, and in particular, a provision which authorizes
farmers to sell saved seeds to other farmers. The main issue is
whether the law places a reasonable limit on the amount of seed a
farmer can save and sell to other farmers or whether the provision is a
wide open exception to the plant breeders' rights. Section 2543 reads,
in pertinent part, that:
it shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by
him from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the
owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on his farm, or for sale as provided in this section:
Provided, That without regard to the provisions of section 2541(3) of this title
it shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person, whose primary farming
occupation is the growing of crops for sale for other than reproductive purposes, to sell such saved seed to other persons so engaged, for reproductive
purposes, provided such sale is in compliance with such State laws governing
160
the sale of seed as may be applicable.

The number of enforcement actions under the Act have been small,
and few cases have reached the federal courts thus limiting the opportunities for courts to interpret the exemption. Two cases which have
reached the courts are Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co.161
and Asgrow Seed Co. v. Kunkle Seed Co.162 One seed company in particular, Asgrow, has been very aggressive about enforcing its rights
under the PVPA and has brought over twenty actions across the country. The most important brown bagging case recently arose in Iowa
and is still being considered by the federal courts. The case of Asgrow
Seed Co. v. Winterboer 6 3 pits one of the nation's largest seed breeders, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Upjohn Co., against a farm family from Clay County, Iowa.
d.

Asgrow v. Winterboer

The facts in Winterboer provide a dramatic illustration of the
stakes involved in brown bagging cases. Asgrow is a major agricultural seed company which has successfully developed and marketed
varieties of soybean seeds. The Winterboers are family farmers who
do business under the name DeeBee's Farm and Seed. Asgrow alleged
160.
161.
162.
163.

7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1988).
694 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1983).
No. 86 Civ. 3138-A (W.D. La. Apr. 1, 1987) aff'd, 845 F.2d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
795 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Iowa 1991).
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its investigation revealed that the Winterboers were brown bagging
Asgrow's seeds by harvesting and selling the seeds in non-descriptive
brown bags, as being just-like Asgrow's varieties. An agent of Asgrow
purchased seeds from the Winterboers, which were tested and determined to be Asgrow A1937 and A2234. Asgrow brought an action in
federal court for an injunction against the Winterboers to not sell any
seed for the 1991 planting season. The Winterboers did not dispute
that Asgrow was the owner of a novel variety protected under the Act,
nor that they had sold progeny of the novel variety-over 10,000 bushels in 1991. Instead, they claimed that over eighty percent of the soybean crop was sold for other than reproductive purposes and
therefore, fell within the farmer saved seed exemption.
The language of 7 U.S.C. § 2543, under which the Winterboers
sought shelter, defines an exempt farmer as a person, whose primary
farming occupation is the growing of crops for sale for other than reproductive purposes .... "164 Asgrow's position was that the farmer
sale provision was limited by the concept of saved seed, meaning a
farmer can only save what is necessary for replanting purposes and
then sell portions of that saved seed if planting needs or intentions
change. Asgrow argued that to read the exemption as broadly as
claimed by the Winterboers would mean farmers could buy and raise
protected varieties and then sell up to half of their crop to other farmers as seed. The company argued that such a broad interpretation of
the saved seed exemption would not forward the congressional intent
of the PVPA, which was to create economic incentives for plant breeders to develop and market novel varieties.
The federal district court granted Asgrow's motion for summary
judgment and its request for a permanent injunction preventing the
Winterboers from making sales of other than saved seed as defined by
the court.' 6 5 The court concluded Congress had not intended to give
farmers an unrestricted right to sell seed, arguing that any other interpretation would have rendered the saved seed provision useless.16 6
According to the court, the inclusion of "saved" to describe the amount
of a seed a farmer is allowed to sell therefore "indicates a clear congressional intent to place limits on the amount of seed a farmer can
sell to other farmers under the Act."167 The issue then became how to
quantify how much seed a farmer could save. The court concluded the
"exception allows a farmer to save, at a maximum, an amount of seed
necessary to plant his soybean acreage for the subsequent crop
year."'168 Assuming soybeans are planted at a rate of one bushel per
164. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1988).
165. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 795 F. Supp. 915, 920 (N.D. Iowa 1991).

166. Id. at 919-20,
167. Id. at 918.
168. Id. at 918-19.
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acre, the court said this would mean if a farmer "could reasonably expect to plant 1500 acres of the protected variety in the subsequent
crop year, the maximum amount of seed that could be classified as
'saved seed' would be 1500 bushels."169 The court recognized "this interpretation of 'saved seed' restricts the number of bushel farmers will
be able to sell to one another" but concluded "the purpose of Congress
in enacting the PVPA was to protect the developer of a new line of
seed and to allow a farmer to sell the prodigy of the novel variety as
limited .. .. "170
The Winterboers appealed the district court decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has jurisdiction
over PVPA appeals. In December 1992, the court reversed the district
court and remanded the case for further proceedings.1 71 The circuit
court ruling is very important because it is a ruling of first impression
on the question of the quantitative limit for the exemption. The appeals court held the "crops exemption" is subject to certain statutory
limits but not a quantitative limit, or "ensuing crop" limit, as devised
by the district court. 172 The court noted that neither the statutory
language nor the legislative context for the 1970 act "suggest that the
crop exemption contains an ensuing crop limitation."i73 The court acknowledged that "without meaningful limitations, the crop exemption
could undercut much of the PVPA incentives. The Act, as written
however, contains no ensuing crop limitation as determined by the
District Court." 174
e.

What the Winterboer Decision Means for Farmers

The appeals court held the crops exemption is subject to the statutory limits found in 7 U.S.C. § 2543. The court identified the limitations to the crops exemption as applicable only when (1) the seed
being saved, used, or sold, has been obtained by authority of the owner
of the variety for seeding purposes; (2) sales are made only to other
farmers; (3) the "primary occupation" of both the seller and buyer of
the seed is "the growing of crops for sale for other than reproductive
purposes;" and (4) the selling farmer remains subject to infringement
under section 2541(3) and (4) of the Act concerning either "sexually
multiplying the novel variety as a step in marketing, or using the
novel variety in producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid
or different variety."175
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 919.
Id. at 918-19.
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 982 F.2d 486 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
Id.
Id. at 489.
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The court determined the crops exemption must be applied on a
crops-by-crops basis, meaning "buyers or sellers of brown bag seed
qualify for the crop exemption only if they produce a larger crop from a
protected seed for consumption (or other nonreproductive purposes)
than for sale as seed."' 7 6 As applied, the test means a court "must
determine the amount of crops a farmer grows for sale to consumers
and the amount of crops a farmer grows for brown bag sales to other
farmers."'7 7 If the farmer sells more to consumers than to other farmers as seed, then the farmer qualifies under the section "to buy or sell
saved seed."' 78 The court specified the exemption applies not just on a
crop-by-crop basis but also to each novel variety.' 7 9 This means a
farmer's production and the amount eligible for sale under the exemption must be calculated for each novel variety produced. Therefore, a
farmer who produced ten acres of one novel variety of PVPA protected
soybeans out of a total of 100 acres of soybeans raised, could only
sell as seed the production from less than half of the ten acres, rather
than consider all soybeans produced. Variety by variety application of
the exemption may increase judicial proceedings on alleged
infringements.
Another issue courts will need to consider is the application of the
limitation on marketing found in the infringement provision of 7
U.S.C. § 2541(3). A statutory conflict is created by providing that
farmers brown bagging seed under section 2543 remain subject to the
infringement provision for marketing. The appeals court recognized
the conflict, noting that "an expansive reading of the term 'marketing'
would swallow the entire crop exemption" which "explicitly permits
farmers to make certain brown bag sales of novel varieties."' 8 0 The
court's answer was to define what marketing means in the context of
section 2541(3). It ruled, "'marketing' in the context of the PVPA
means extensive or coordinated selling activities, such as advertising,
using an intervening sales representative, or similar extended merchandising or retail activities."181
There are several other practical implications from the ruling.
First, the court ruled there is no second level brown bagging. In other
words, a farmer who buys brown bag seed may neither save nor sell
any of the crop produced as seed because the seed was not obtained
"by authority of the owner of the variety."' 8 2 This interpretation is
subject to question, however, because the farmer exemption reads "to
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 490.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 492.
Id.
Id. at 490 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1988)).
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save seed produced by him from seed obtained, or descendedfrom seed
obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes."18 3 Any seed produced from legally brown bagged seed would

have descended from seed originally obtained under the authority of
the owner of the variety. A second issue clarified by the opinion is
that if a farmer's sales qualify under the crop exemption, they are not
subject to most of the infringement provisions of section 2541, including the requirement of section 2541(6) that purchasers be notified the
seed is a protected variety.' 8 4
2. Other PVPA Provisions
Even though the issue in Winterboeris still before the courts, farmers and attorneys must realize there are limits to the farmer exemption, and violating the law can result in expensive legal actions. The
law provides if an infringement is found "the court shall award damages adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no event less
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the variety by the infringer, together with interest and costs."' 8 5 The court may triple the
damages if it desires, and in exceptional cases can award reasonable
attorney fees to the winning side. A second feature of the farmer exemption is farmer sales must meet state requirements, such as labeling. The law reads, "provided such sale is in compliance with such
State laws governing the sale of seed as may be applicable."186 Thus,
another claim a company could make in an infringement action is that
the farmer sales did not meet state seed laws.
3. Seed Industry Efforts to Amend the PVPA
The Federal Circuit decision was a serious set back for the seed
industry which had already embraced the district court ruling as a
reasonable limitation on brown bagging. The company has since petitioned the United States Supreme Court to hear an appeal in the case,
and the petition for certiorari was granted.18 7 The decision has also
led to increased efforts by the seed industry to get Congress to amend
the PVPA to prohibit farmers from selling any saved seed to other
farmers. Senator Kerrey of Nebraska recently introduced such a
bill.188
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1988)(emphasis added).
982 F.2d 486, 492 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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The attempt to amend the PVPA to prohibit farmer sales of saved
seed is part of an effort by farmers to convince the United States to
ratify 1991 amendments to an international treaty relating to breeders' rights. The United States was a party to the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) in
Geneva, an international treaty which protects the interests of plant
breeders.189 The treaty, amended in 1991, provides a farmers exemption allowing the saving of seed to plant a crop, but not to sell. The
congressional debate will give farmers the opportunity to tell
lawmakers how they feel about recognizing intellectual property
rights in plants.
C. Plant Patents and Exemptions: No Right for Farmers to
Save Seed?
In recent years seed companies have also increased their use of
utility patents to protect new plant creations.1 9o One important issue
concerning patents is what rights farmers have to save seed to plant
in future years. The answer appears to be that there is no right to do
so. Unlike the PVPA, patent law contains no express farmer exemption, meaning there is no right to save patented seed. In addition,
there is no express research exemption, meaning plant breeders may
not use patented seeds to further improvements without first receiving the permission of the patent holder and paying a royalty or license
fee. The lack of exemptions to patents makes them attractive to the
seed companies, but also raises issues concerning the impact on farmers and on plant breeding, particularly public breeding efforts. Will
the granting of patents on new crops benefit agriculture and society?
Will a scramble by private companies to claim ownership in plants
further erode public plant breeding and encourage "industrialization"
of agriculture? These are questions society, public plant breeders, and
farmers must ask to clarify existing rules.

saved seed would be eliminated. For a discussion of this proposal, see New PVPA
Amendments Proposed by Senator Bob Kerrey Would Bring U.S. in Line With
UPOV, DIvERsIrY, vol. 9, no. 4 1993/vol. 10, no. 1, 1994, at 57.
189. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Mar. 19,

1991. Hei's No. KAV 3102.
190. For a recent discussion of issues in plant patenting from the perspective of the
U.S. Patent Office, see ELIZABETH C. WEIMAR, CROP SCIENCE SOCIETY OF
AbMERICA, UPDATE ON CURRENT STATUS OF PATENT FILINGS INVOLVING PLANTS AND
OTHER RELATED ISSUES, CSSA SPECIAL PUB. #21, 79 (1993). For a report on the
broader subject of crop genetics, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING
GLOBAL GENETIC RESOURCES: AGRICULTURAL CROP ISSUES AND POLICIES (Na-

tional Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1993).
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Intellectual Property Rights in Seeds and World Trade
Intellectual property protections for plants are also an issue for international trade. 19 ' The United States has pushed for their full recognition in international trade agreements. For example, in the
GATT negotiations, the Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs)
Accord includes intellectual property protections for plants either in
the form of patents, "breeders rights," or both, as does the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).192 Concerns about the
impact on biotechnology and property rights in plants were the reason
the United States originally refused to sign the Biodiversity Treaty at
the Earth Summit in 1992.193 President Clinton signed the treaty in
June 1993, but the issues still remain controversial.
Thomas Jefferson, who helped create our system of family farms,
said, "[t~he greatest service which can be rendered any country is to
add a useful plant to its culture." 194 Jefferson, who also wrote the
nation's first patent law, was no doubt correct about the importance of
adding new plants to our agricultural heritage, but the question is
whether he would also have expected the person who "discovered" the
plant or scientist who "engineered" the gene to own it. Ownership and
control of the plant genetic resources will irreversibly shape the future
of agriculture and are important issues for society. Farmers have perhaps the greatest interest in these issues and thus need to be aware
what the laws provide.
D.

V. CONCLUSION: FUTURE ISSUES IN CONTRACT
PRODUCTION OF GRAIN
This Article has considered a variety of legal issues which may
arise in connection with use of contracts in grain production. The discussion has reviewed language found in contracts currently being
used to identify the legal obligations imposed and to illustrate some of
the legal questions which might arise if disputes develop. The Article
has also considered recent court cases which help illustrate the practical application of existing contract laws to grain production relations.
The important economic opportunities created by efforts to expand
value-added production and marketing of identity-preserved grain
crops means it is essential farmers and their lawyers have a better
understanding of the impact of raising crops under contract. The increased use of production contracts, which will accompany these de191. For a more detailed discussion of the impact of intellectual property rights in

shaping agriculture, see Hamilton, supra note 159.
192. See Hamilton, supra note 159 at 613-17.
193. Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Environmental Program,
June 5, 1992.
194. THE GARDEN AND FARm BooKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 509 (Robert C. Baron ed.,
1987).
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velopments, will no doubt result in legal questions and disputes over
interpreting contract language. Some of these issues will relate to
protecting intellectual property rights in agricultural genetics and
how these legal protections limit the ability of farmers to save and sell
their seeds. The desire by seed companies and others involved in developing improved and higher value crop genetics to protect their investments is understandable. The United States has recognized an
array of intellectual property laws which are available for this use.
The development and interpretation of these protections, some of
which-such as plant patenting-are now receiving their first extensive use, will add important legal issues to those shaping the future of
agriculture. Protection of intellectual property rights in crop genetics
is a factor contributing directly to increased use of contract production. Whether contract production of grain will provide an opportunity for farmers to improve their financial condition, or instead
become a way in which farmers lose their independence to agricultural supply and marketing firms, will be an important question in
determining the future structure of agriculture in the United States.
Hopefully, this Article will prove of assistance to parties wrestling
with these issues.

